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INTERPRETING CONGRESSIONAL SILENCE:




According to the Senate Judiciary Committee, abuses of the class action
device by aggressive lawyers and lenient state judges have "undermine[d]
the national judicial system, the free flow of interstate commerce, and the
concept of diversity jurisdiction as intended by the framers of the United
States Constitution."' In response, Congress passed the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) in a stated attempt to reestablish the "fair and
prompt" resolution of class actions. 2 CAFA attempted to achieve this end
by broadening the federal judiciary's ability to hear large class actions,
making significant modifications to both statutory law and judge-made
federal precedent on subject matter jurisdiction and removal.3
Soon after CAFA's February 2005 enactment, many district courts found
that CAFA had the potential to alter more than its text explicitly provided.
CAFA did not contain a statutory provision that disturbed the long-standing
rule that a party attempting to remove a state action to federal court bears
the burden of establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction. However,
portions of the Senate Judiciary Committee's Report and the House
Sponsor's Statement explicitly express the intent to change the common
law rule and instead require an objecting plaintiff to demonstrate that
applicable jurisdictional requirements are unfulfilled.4
This Note concludes that the congressional statements did not shift the
burden of establishing diversity jurisdiction to class plaintiffs as part of
CAFA's effort to favor federal jurisdiction. This Note argues that a court
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor
Marc Arkin for her insight and guidance.
1. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2, 119 Stat. 4, 5 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2. See id. § 2(b) ("The purposes of this Act are to-(I) assure fair and prompt
recoveries for class members with legitimate claims; (2) restore the intent of the framers of
the United States Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of interstate
cases of national importance under diversity jurisdiction; and (3) benefit society by
encouraging innovation and lowering consumer prices.").
3. See infra Part I.B.2.
4. See infra Part I.B.2.d.
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hearing this issue should follow the U.S. Supreme Court's guidance in
Shannon v. United States5 and refuse to treat as binding authority
statements within a statute's legislative history that are not linked to
specific enacted text.6 A contrary result would be a precedent allowing
interested parties to undermine the lawmaking process by surreptitiously
inserting statements into a bill's legislative history to manipulate statutory
interpretation by the judiciary. 7 In addition, this Note argues that in the
interests of judicial efficiency the burden of proof should remain on the
proponent of the federal forum. 8
Part I of this Note discusses the background rules governing subject
matter jurisdiction and removal prior to the Class Action Fairness Act. It
then examines the changes that CAFA made to class action litigation with
particular attention toward federal subject matter and removal jurisdiction.
Part I also discusses the different theories regarding the proper use of
legislative history in statutory interpretation. Part II reviews federal court
opinions that have decided the issue of which party bears the risk of non-
persuasion in a remand action after removal. Part III advocates for the
continued use of the traditional rule despite evidence in the legislative
history of the Judiciary Committee's intent to the contrary.
I. THE SCOPE OF CAFA's MODIFICATIONS OF CLASS ACTION PROCEDURE
This part provides the necessary background information to understand
the disagreement over which party should bear the burden of proving
CAFA's diversity requirements on a motion to remand after removal. Part
L.A introduces the law pertinent to diversity jurisdiction of class actions
prior to CAFA's enactment, including removal and the burden of proof.
Part I.B examines CAFA's impact on class action procedure in response to
the congressional finding of widespread abuse of class actions in state
courts. Part I.C compares the subjective and objective theories of statutory
interpretation and concludes with an analysis of the Supreme Court's recent
treatment of legislative history in the interpretive process.
A. Jurisdiction over Class Actions Prior to CAFA
The following subsections focus on the federal judiciary's ability to hear
class actions prior to CAFA's enactment. Part I.A. 1 introduces basic
principles of federal diversity jurisdiction. Part I.A.2 describes the
procedure governing the removal of diversity actions. Part I.A.3
summarizes the traditional burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction.
5. 512 U.S. 573 (1994).
6. See infra Part III.A.
7. See infra Part III.B.
8. See infra Part III.C.
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1. Original Diversity Jurisdiction
It is "a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence" that federal courts
are courts of limited jurisdiction. 9 Federal courts may hear only cases
within both the grant of Article III of the Constitution and a congressional
statutory grant of jurisdiction.' 0 For example, to provide a forum for
plaintiffs who seek to vindicate federal rights, pursuant to Article 111,11
Congress conferred on the "district courts... original jurisdiction of all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States." 12
Congress has no duty to grant federal subject matter jurisdiction to the
full limits authorized by Article III, but is free to "establish priorities for the
allocation of judicial resources" and leave some controversies to the
states. 13 For example, in the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress created
diversity jurisdiction pursuant to the constitutional grant of federal judicial
power over "[c]ontroversies ... between [c]itizens of different [s]tates."' 14
However, Congress did not authorize federal jurisdiction over all
controversies between citizens of different states. Instead, to prevent a
flood of minor disputes from entering the federal forum, it limited the reach
of federal courts with a $500 minimum amount in controversy
requirement.' 5 Moreover, in 1806, the Supreme Court further limited
diversity jurisdiction in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, interpreting the Federal
9. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320, 321 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd on
other grounds, 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
10. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 692 (1986) ("In origin and design,
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; they exercise only the authority conferred on
them by Art. III and by congressional enactments pursuant thereto."); In re Morrissey, 717
F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1983) ("United States district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction
and Congress, as allowed by the Constitution, must expressly grant them the power and
authority to hear and decide cases."); see also 13 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller &
Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction and Related Matters § 3522
(2d ed. 1984).
11. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority .....
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
13. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 36 (1980); see Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 440,
449 (1850) ("The political truth is, that the disposal of the judicial power (except in a few
specified instances) belongs to Congress; and Congress is not bound to enlarge the
jurisdiction of the Federal courts to every subject, in every form which the Constitution
might warrant." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
14. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000)) (granting diversity jurisdiction to the
Article III courts).
15. See Judiciary Act of 1789 § 11 ("[T]he circuit courts shall have original cognizance,
concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law
or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five
hundred dollars, and.., the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought,
and a citizen of another State.").
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Judiciary Act of 1789 to require complete diversity of citizenship between
the parties. 16
Numerous congressional amendments have changed the scope of federal
diversity jurisdiction over time. 17 Section 1332(a) of 28 U.S.C. currently
grants federal district courts original jurisdiction over any civil action
(including class actions) in which the parties are completely diverse' 8 and
the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.19 The diversity statute does
not differentiate class actions from other civil actions; instead the federal
judiciary developed rules to apply the relatively simple requirements of
section 1332 to the more complex structure of a class action. For class
actions pled under section 1332, the citizenship of putative class members
is ignored; only the named plaintiffs are considered in assessing the
complete diversity requirement. 20 Moreover, prior to 2005, each class
member (not merely the class representatives) was required to satisfy
independently the $75,000 amount in controversy. 21
2. Removal Jurisdiction in Diversity Actions
The plaintiff is the master of her complaint and can therefore file her case
in state court without giving any thought to whether the case could satisfy
16. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806). The U.S. Supreme Court
has long interpreted this to require "complete diversity," meaning that all plaintiffs must be
citizens of different states than all defendants. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire,
386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967) ("[The Supreme] Court held that the diversity of citizenship
statute required 'complete diversity': where co-citizens appeared on both sides of a dispute,
jurisdiction was lost.").
17. 13B Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 10, § 3601 (discussing congressional
amendments to diversity jurisdiction).
18. Section 1332 creates diversity jurisdiction over cases between citizens of different
states or between citizens of a state of the United States and a citizen of a foreign state. 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)-(2) (2000).
19. See id. § 1332(a).
20. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969) ("[I]f one member of a class is of
diverse citizenship from the class' opponent, and no nondiverse members are named parties,
the suit may be brought in federal court even though all other members of the class are
citizens of the same State as the defendant and have nothing to fear from trying the lawsuit
in the courts of their own State.").
21. Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973). Prior to 2005, circuit courts had
been split over whether 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) overruled Zahn by granting supplementaljurisdiction over claims that are part of the same case or controversy. Compare Rosmer v.
Pfizer Inc., 263 F.3d 110, 114 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that supplemental jurisdiction
overruled Zahn and applies to diversity class actions), with Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d
946, 961-62 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that all putative class members must individually
satisfy the federal amount in controversy). However, several months after the enactment of
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), the Supreme Court resolved the split and
held that § 1367 overruled Zahn and confers federal jurisdiction over additional plaintiffs
who fail to satisfy the minimum amount-in-controversy requirement, as long as "the other
elements of jurisdiction are present and at least one named plaintiff in the action satisfies the
amount-in-controversy requirement." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S.
Ct. 2611, 2615 (2005).
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federal diversity jurisdiction.22 The defendant has no constitutional right to
remove a case to federal court, 23 but Congress has authorized removal
under certain situations. Class actions pled under section 1332, like other
civil actions, can be removed from state court via 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446,
and 1447. These provisions permit defendants to remove most civil actions
meeting the diversity requirements originally brought in state court.24
However, due to several exceptions to the removal statutes, 25 "diversity
jurisdiction in removal cases [is] narrower than if the case were originally
filed in federal court by the plaintiff. '26 For instance, removal of a diversity
jurisdiction action is unavailable if any defendant "is a citizen of the State
in which [the] action is brought. '27 In addition, a multi-defendant case can
be removed to federal court only if all defendants consent to removal. 28
Furthermore, unlike cases removable under federal question jurisdiction,
diversity actions cannot be removed to a district court more than one year
after their commencement in state court.29
3. The Burden of Establishing Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Whether a civil action is filed in federal court in the first instance or
arrives by removal, federal courts are under a constant duty to respect the
powers reserved to the states by refusing to adjudicate cases outside of the
jurisdictional bounds established by Congress. 30 To help fulfill that duty,
22. Hurt v. Dow Chem. Co., 963 F.2d 1142, 1145 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting that the
plaintiff had the right to file in state court even though the diversity requirements were
fulfilled).
23. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 349 (1816) (noting that the
power of removal is not to be found in express terms in any part of the constitution" and
therefore it is subject to complete legislative control).
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000). Removal procedure is governed by 28 U.S.C. §§
1446 and 1447.
25. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) (creating the workmen's compensation exception); §
1446(b) (creating a one-year limit on removal of diversity actions).
26. Hurt, 963 F.2d at 1145; see also Ziegler v. Champion Mortgage Co., 913 F.2d 228,
230 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Substantively, the scope of removal jurisdiction can be narrower than
that of subject matter jurisdiction.").
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
28. See Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 248 (1900)
(requiring the consent of all defendants to remove); Harper v. AutoAlliance Int'l, Inc., 392
F.3d 195, 201 (6th Cir. 2004) ("The rule of unanimity requires that in order for a notice of
removal to be properly before the court, all defendants who have been served or otherwise
properly joined in the action must either join in the removal, or file a written consent to the
removal." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Generally, a notice of removal must be filed in the district
court within thirty days of service of the initial state pleadings. Id. However, if the case is
not removable at the time of the initial state court pleading, all cases (except those conferring
jurisdiction under section 1332) may be removed within thirty days of the date of the event
that made the case removable. Id.
30. See 13 Wright, Miller, & Cooper, supra note 10, § 3522. Even if the parties do not
dispute the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, federal trial and appellate courts are
bound to find the lack of their own (or the lower court's) subject matter jurisdiction on their
own motion. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1244 (2006) ("[All federal
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courts have established procedures to ensure that a case falls properly
within their subject matter jurisdiction. For example, a federal court must
always presume that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking until the contrary
is affirmatively demonstrated.31 In the complaint, the plaintiff must plead
facts showing the existence of subject matter jurisdiction.32 Moreover, if
the jurisdictional facts in the complaint are disputed, the Supreme Court has
placed the burden on the plaintiff seeking to invoke the power of the federal
court to demonstrate the existence of subject matter jurisdiction.33
Courts have developed similar rules when a party attempts to remove a
case from state court. If removal is contested, the removing party, who in
this case is the defendant, carries the initial burden of establishing subject
matter jurisdiction since it is the one seeking federal court power.34 If the
removing party successfully establishes that the federal court had original
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim, then the burden of proof shifts to the
proponent of remand to show that the claim falls under an express statutory
exception to removal. 35
courts] have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction
exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party."); Pac. Towboat & Salvage Co. v.
Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 620 F.2d 727, 729 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting that
"jurisdiction... under Article III is always open to inquiry upon the court's own motion").
31. See Grace v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 109 U.S. 278, 283 (1883) ("As the jurisdiction of
the circuit court is limited... the presumption is that a cause is without its jurisdiction
unless the contrary affirmatively appears."); Memphis Am. Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2032 v.
Bd. of Educ. of Memphis City Schools, 534 F.2d 699, 701 (6th Cir. 1976) ("It was
inappropriate for the District Court to assume the existence of jurisdiction and then to
proceed to decide the merits of this case. Without a finding that there is federal jurisdiction
over a particular claim for relief the federal courts are without power to proceed.").
32. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) ("A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief.., shall
contain.., a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction
depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of
jurisdiction to support it .... ); see also McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S.
178, 182, 189 (1936) ("It is incumbent upon the plaintiff properly to allege the jurisdictional
facts, according to the nature of the case.... He must allege in his pleading the facts
essential to show jurisdiction.").
33. Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 446 (1942) ("[I]f a plaintiffs allegations of
jurisdictional facts are challenged by the defendant, the plaintiff bears the burden of
supporting the allegations by competent proof."); McNutt, 298 U.S. at 189 ("If [the
plaintiffs] allegations of jurisdictional facts are challenged by his adversary in any
appropriate manner, he must support them by competent proof.").
34. See Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921) ("[T]he petitioning
defendant must take and carry the burden of proof, he being the actor in the removal
proceeding."); Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (1 1th Cir. 2001) ("Because
this case was originally filed in state court and removed to federal court by [the defendant],
[the defendant] bears the burden of proving that federal jurisdiction exists."); Gaus v. Miles,
Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The 'strong presumption' against removal
jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is
proper.").
35. See Breuer v. Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691, 698 (2003)
("(W]henever the subject matter of an action qualifies it for removal, the burden is on a
plaintiff to find an express exception.").
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The removal statutes have been strictly construed, with all doubts over
jurisdictional requirements being resolved in favor of remand. 36 Strict
construction is necessary because "defendant's use of that statute deprives a
state court of a case properly before it and thereby implicates important
federalism concerns." 37 Federal courts have recognized their role as limited
tribunals and have taken caution only to allow removal in cases explicitly
authorized by a statutory grant of Congress. 38
B. Perceived Class Action Abuses Created a Demandfor Reform
The class action device traditionally has served as a tool of efficiency. It
can spare courts the burden of hearing hundreds of duplicative cases while
also providing recourse for plaintiffs whose claims would not otherwise be
economically feasible. 39 However, the class action has also become an
efficient tool of entrepreneurial plaintiffs' lawyers because by the mere fact
of aggregation it creates an opportunity to earn higher fees than other
actions without the same level of work that the equivalent number of
individual actions would require. 40 Therefore, especially in state courts,
judges have found a striking increase of class action disputes on their
dockets; during the period of 1988 to 1998, class action filings against
Fortune 500 companies increased by more than 300% in federal courts and
by more than 1000% in state courts.41
Following the rapid growth of class actions, the United States Chamber
of Commerce and numerous legal commentators sought reform to a system
36. See, e.g., Syngenta Crop. Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) ("[S]tatutory
procedures for removal are to be strictly construed."); Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,
313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941) ("[Tlhe policy of the successive acts of Congress regulating the
jurisdiction of federal courts is one calling for the strict construction of [the removal
statute].").
37. Frank v. Bear Steams & Co., 128 F.3d 919, 922 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Lontz v.
Tharp, 413 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2005) (discussing their "obligation to construe removal
jurisdiction strictly because of the significant federalism concerns implicated by it" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
38. See Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 109 ("Due regard for the rightful independence of
state governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that they scrupulously
confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined." (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc. 420 F.3d 1090, 1094-95 (10th Cir.
2005) ("It is well-established that.., removal statutes... are to be narrowly construed in
light of our constitutional role as limited tribunals.").
39. See 1 Joseph M. McLaughlin, McLaughlin on Class Actions: Law and Practice 1-1
(3d ed. 2006); Stuart T. Rossman & Charles Delbaum, Consumer Class Actions 3-6 (6th ed.
2006).
40. See Rossman & Delbaum, supra note 39, at 4 ("Attorney fees may be significantly
higher in a class action than in an individual action, even if the amount of attorney time is
equivalent.").
41. Judiciary Committee Report on Class Action Fairness Act, S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 13
(2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 14; Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens &
Leah Lorber, Federal Courts Should Decide Interstate Class Actions: A Call For Federal
Class Action Diversity Jurisdiction Reform, 37 Harv. J. on Legis. 483, 488 (2000).
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that they believed was riddled with abuse.42 These commentators attributed
much of the abuse to state courts, and therefore they argued that Congress
should broaden diversity jurisdiction over class actions to "provide a fairer
and more impartial federal court forum for interstate class actions. '43 Many
politicians resisted, arguing that the real motivation for class action reform
was to appease big business lobbyists by cutting corporate litigation costs at
tort victims' expense. 44 These opponents of tort reform believed that
federal courts are generally less receptive to class actions and apply the
certification rules stringently. 45  Therefore, the federalization of class
actions would substantially reduce the plaintiffs probability of prevailing
on a motion for class certification, which would likely prevent many with
viable claims from filing individual actions.46 Whether its real motivation
was to correct class action abuses or simply to reduce corporate legal
liability, Congress took notice. It passed CAFA in February 2005 in an
attempt to assure fair adjudication of class actions and to modify the
diversity rules governing class actions to match the intent of the framers of
the Constitution.47 CAFA took action in four areas-it broadened federal
jurisdiction over class actions, amended the rules involving removal,
expanded appeal opportunities, and increased judicial oversight of
settlements. 48  Following CAFA's enactment, the Senate Judiciary
Committee released a report detailing the Act's content and scope.49 Part
I.B.1 discusses the perceived class action abuses that Congress believed
required reform.
42. See, e.g., Lisa Litwiller, Why Amendments to Rule 23 Are Not Enough: A Case for
the Federalization of Class Actions, 7 Chap. L. Rev. 201, 218-19 (2004); American Tort
Reform Foundation, Judicial Hellholes 2004, at 6-7 (2004), http://www.atra.org/reports/
hellholes/2004/hellholes2004.pdf [hereinafter Judicial Hellholes 2004]; Schwartz, Behrens
& Lorber, supra note 41, at 511-13.
43. Schwartz, Behrens & Lorber, supra note 41, at 510; see also Litwiller, supra note
42, at 215-18.
44. See 151 Cong. Rec. H723, H733, H737 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statements of Rep.
Markey and Rep. Inslee); see also John Conyers, Jr., Class Action "Fairness "-A Bad Deal
for the States and Consumers, 40 Harv. J. on Legis. 493, 506-10 (2003); Judiciary
Committee Report on Class Action Fairness Act, S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 51-76, as reprinted
in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 48-71.
45. See Allison M. Gruenwald, Note, Rethinking Place of Business as Choice of Law in
Class Action Lawsuits, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1925, 1927-28 (2005).
46. See Conyers, supra note 44, at 506-09. Many potential class plaintiffs would
proceed with individual actions after a court denies certification. However, absent the
economic efficiencies of the class action device, many will chose not (or even realize their
opportunity) to litigate their potential claim. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
47. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2 § 2(b), 119 Stat. 4, 5 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) ("The purposes of this Act are to-(1) assure fair
and prompt recoveries for class members with legitimate claims; (2) restore the intent of the
framers of the United States Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of
interstate cases of national importance under diversity jurisdiction; and (3) benefit society by
encouraging innovation and lowering consumer prices.").
48. See id. §§ 3-5.
49. Judiciary Committee Report on Class Action Fairness Act, S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 4-
5, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5-6.
2752 [Vol. 75
2007] CAFA 'S JURISDICTIONAL BURDEN OF PROOF
1. Congressional Findings
The Judiciary Committee's report outlined reasons why most plaintiffs'
lawyers usually prefer to bring class actions in state court.50 In most
jurisdictions there is no advantage to be gained from state procedural rules
per se because "the rules governing the decision whether cases may proceed
as class actions are basically the same in federal and state courts." 51
Despite the statutory similarities, Congress found that plaintiffs' lawyers
aggressively litigate class actions in state courts in part because of the state
judges' lax application of procedural rules.52  The Senate Judiciary
Committee accused state judges of carelessly certifying non-meritorious
class actions since they do not always "follow[] the strict requirements of
Rule 23 (or the state's parallel governing rule), which are intended to
protect the due process rights of both unnamed class members and
defendants." 53  The Committee stated that some state court judges have
certified class actions, "not because they believe a class trial would be more
efficient than an individual trial, but because they believe class certification
will simply induce the defendant to settle the case without trial."'54
Moreover, the Judiciary Committee believed that class plaintiffs' attorneys
more often file in state court because of the weaker judicial scrutiny over
proposed settlements. It reasoned that due to "the explosion of state court
class actions" and a lack of resources compared with their federal
counterparts, 55 state judges have been overwhelmed by their dockets. 56
50. See id. at 10-23, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 11-23; see also McLaughlin,
supra note 39, at 2-3 ("From the defense perspective, there may be several advantages to
litigating a class action in federal court, including: (i) controlling applicability of the more
exacting requirements for class certification enunciated by federal courts; (ii) greater
availability of interlocutory review of class certification rulings; (iii) greater ability to
consolidate related litigation through 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) transfers and the Multidistrict
Litigation Panel; (iv) less restrictive use of summary judgment; and (v) access to jury pools
outside the immediate locality of plaintiffs."). But see Rossman & Delbaum, supra note 39,
at 25 (stating that federal court may often be favorable because some states have strict rules
and less experience in handling large class actions).
51. Judiciary Committee Report on Class Action Fairness Act, S. Rep. No. 109-14, at
13, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 14 (noting that "thirty-six states have adopted the
basic federal class action rule (Rule 23)" and most others adopted "similar requirements").
However, state class action rules can vary considerably. For example, Mississippi does not
permit class actions. See Robert H. Klonoff, The Adoption of a Class Action Rule: Some
Issues for Mississippi to Consider, 24 Miss. C. L. Rev. 261, 261 (2005). With this in mind,
Congress created the mass action provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1 1), to remove large
actions joined under common questions of law or fact, which the Judiciary Committee
labeled "class actions in disguise." Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 41, at 47; see
infra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
52. Judiciary Committee Report on Class Action Fairness Act, S. Rep. No. 109-14, at
14, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 14.
53. Id., as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 14.
54. Id. at 21, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 21.
55. Id. at 14, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 15 (noting that state judges face
heavier dockets and lack the resources-including law clerks and magistrate judges-to
devote enough time to properly assess class action settlements).
56. Id., as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 15.
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With less time at their disposal, state judges are more likely to approve
unfair settlements with massive fee awards. 57
The Senate Judiciary Committee believed that these state court judges
enabled a system of "judicial blackmail." 58 A proponent of tort reform has
observed that attorneys often file class actions in state court simply to create
a risk of a massive verdict and to "put[] enormous pressure on corporate
executives to settle even the flimsiest of cases in order to appease anxious
shareholders. '59  Similarly, the Judiciary Committee found that the
potential liability of losing a "nationwide" class action has put corporate
defendants at the mercy of class action attorneys: "[B]asic economics"
compels corporations to settle even when the claims are so meritless that
there is "only a five percent chance of success." 60 The Committee found
that attorneys have taken advantage of that leverage for their own personal
gain, creating settlements that bestow a windfall on the attorneys without
providing meaningful compensation to class members. 61
The Committee believed that federal courts are the proper forums for
multistate class actions since these cases "usually involve large amounts of
money and many plaintiffs, and have significant implications for interstate
commerce and national policy." 62 Consequently, it believed that sweeping
more class actions into federal courts would alleviate the abuses that were
undermining the rights of class action defendants and adversely affecting
national commerce. 63 It sought to amend the rules governing diversity
jurisdiction and removal of class actions to reach that end.
Congress blamed the outdated diversity requirements for keeping many
large class actions out of federal courts. 64 The Senate Judiciary Committee
stated that these "class actions.., involve millions of parties from
numerous states [and therefore] present the precise concerns that diversity
jurisdiction was designed to prevent. '65 However, class actions did not
exist when diversity jurisdiction was created by the First Judiciary Act of
1789.66 Since the diversity rules predate class actions, the Committee
57. See id., as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 15.
58. Id. at 20-2 1, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 21-22.
59. Schwartz, Behrens & Lorber, supra note 41, at 484.
60. Judiciary Committee Report on Class Action Fairness Act, S. Rep. No. 109-14, at
21, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 21.
61. Id. at 14-20, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 15-20 (discussing class action
settlements including a settlement, approved by an Alabama state court, in which each class
member received $8.76 and class counsel received $8.5 million in fees).
62. Id. at 27, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 27.
63. See id., as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 27.
64. See id. at 6, 10-12, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7, 11-13. The report cites
numerous federal opinions that call for revision of the diversity requirements governing class
actions, including Davis v. Carl Cannon Chevrolet-Olds, Inc., 182 F.3d 792, 798 (11 th Cir.
1999) (Nangle, J., concurring), which labeled the strict compliance to the diversity rules as
"antiquated, out-of-date judicial theories."
65. Judiciary Committee Report on Class Action Fairness Act, S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 6,
as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7.
66. See id., as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7.
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found that many class actions encompass the type of case that the founders
thought deserved the protections of the federal forum, but are excluded
from federal courts by the current statutory diversity scheme. 67 Therefore,
the Judiciary Committee concluded that the diversity and removal rules do
not relate properly to large class actions, and this "technical glitch" needed
reform.68
Legislators were particularly critical of attorneys' exploitation of
diversity jurisdiction to "game" the procedural rules to prevent removal. 69
Plaintiffs' attorneys often add nominal claims against in-state defendants
(e.g., a local retailer or distributor) to claims against a national corporation
for the sole purpose of defeating complete diversity. 70 After one year, the
plaintiffs counsel could then voluntarily dismiss the claim against the local
party. The claim would then meet diversity, but removal would still be
prohibited under Section 1446(b)'s non-waivable one-year time limit.71
Even if the court dismisses the claim against the local defendant on a
pretrial motion or motion for summary judgment, the dismissed party's
residency will continue to prevent removal absent a showing of "fraudulent
joinder."72  Similarly, class action complaints often include provisions
stating that no class member will seek more than $75,000 in damages. 73 If
accepted by the court as true, this provision would prevent removal without
limiting potential damages because plaintiffs could amend their complaint
as necessary after the one-year statutory deadline for removal to federal
court.
7 4
The Judiciary Committee seemingly ignored the steps federal courts can
take to limit plaintiffs' ability to avoid diversity jurisdiction. For example,
"fraudulent joinder" litigation recently has drawn more attention in federal
courts.75 Under this doctrine, if the court determines that the party was
67. Id. at 6, 10-12, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7, 11-13. The report cited
Davis, 182 F.3d at 797-98, which stated that the court is "bound" to "reject any policy-based
arguments" for remand although "[o]ne would think that this case is exactly what those who
espouse the historical justification for [diversity jurisdiction] would have had in mind."
68. Judiciary Committee Report on Class Action Fairness Act, S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 6,
as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7.
69. Id. at 10, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 11.
70. Id., as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 11-12.
71. See supra note 29 and accompanying text; see also Russaw v. Voyager Life Ins. Co.,
921 F. Supp. 723, 725 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (refusing to extend the one-year limit on removal,
even when a defendant was joined for the sole purpose of destroying diversity).
72. See Whitcomb v. Smithson, 175 U.S. 635, 637-38 (1900) (holding that a case does
not become removable after the dismissal of a local defendant creates complete diversity
among the remaining parties); see also James M. Underwood, From Proxy to Principle:
Fraudulent Joinder Reconsidered, 69 Alb. L. Rev. 1013, 1021-22 (2006) (discussing the
voluntary/involuntary dismissal rule).
73. Judiciary Cormittee Report on Class Action Fairness Act, S. Rep. No. 109-14, at
11, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 12.
74. See id., as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 12.; supra note 29 and accompanying
text.
75. See E. Farish Percy, Making a Federal Case of It: Removing Civil Cases to Federal
Court Based on Fraudulent Joinder, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 189, 191-92 (2005).
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joined solely to defeat jurisdiction, it is permitted to disregard the party for
diversity purposes.76 In addition, several federal courts have found removal
proper despite plaintiffs' contentions that the amount in controversy would
not exceed the jurisdictional requirement.77
Nevertheless, plaintiffs' attorneys seem adept at bringing (and keeping)
class actions in state courts that are particularly "class action friendly."
Proponents of tort reform have labeled certain jurisdictions "magnet courts"
because of their overwhelming bias against class action defendants. For
example, the American Tort Reform Association has dubbed Madison
County, Illinois a "magnet court"-and a "judicial hellhole"-in part
because of its state court judges' pro-plaintiff attitude and penchant for
certifying any proposed class action to fall on their docket. 78 After a
Madison County court certifies a class action, defendants most often seek to
settle the claim because the "working-man" demographic of the area has
created a reputation among trial lawyers for leading to equally pro-plaintiff
jury pools.79 Plantiffs' lawyers have responded; the number of class actions
filed in Madison County grew from two in 1998 to 106 in 2003,80 most of
which involve nationwide classes suing large multinational corporations. 81
In Madison County, a rural area with a population of less than 300,000,82
class action litigation has become a business, with lawyers running
76. See Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 302 (2d Cir. 2004) ("The
doctrine of fraudulent joinder is meant to prevent plaintiffs from joining non-diverse parties
in an effort to defeat federal jurisdiction."); Schwartz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 174
F.3d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[A]lthough a plaintiff is normally free to choose its own
forum, it may not join an in-state defendant solely for the purpose of defeating federal
diversity jurisdiction."); see also McLaughlin, supra note 39, § 2-3.
77. See De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1411 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[W]e hold that
if a defendant can show that the amount in controversy actually exceeds the jurisdictional
amount, the plaintiff must be able to show that, as a matter of law, it is certain that he will
not be able to recover more than the damages for which he has prayed in the state court
complaint. Such a rule is necessary to avoid the sort of manipulation that has occurred in the
instant case."); In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 918 F. Supp. 178, 180 (E.D.
Tex. 1996) (standing for the same principle). But see Kline v. Avis Rent a Car Sys., Inc., 66
F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1240 (S.D. Ala. 1999) (holding that "plaintiff is still master of her own
claim... [and] the court will not consider. .. waived claims in determining whether the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
78. Judicial Hellholes 2004, supra note 42, at 14-18.
79. Christi Parsons, Downstate County Is a 'Plaintif's Paradise': Class Action Suits
Rising Dramatically, Critics Complain, Chi. Trib., June 17, 2002, § 1, at 1.
80. Judiciary Committee Report on Class Action Fairness Act, S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 13
(2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 14. In the week prior to CAFA's enactment,
when it became clear that it soon would be more difficult to keep a class action in state court,
twenty class actions were filed in Madison County. Statement by President of the United
States, 41 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 265, 266 (Feb. 18, 2005), as reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. S3.
81. Judicial Hellholes 2004, supra note 42, at 15 (listing class actions filed in Madison
County against corporations such as American Express, Sears Roebuck, Intel, and Ford).
82. Parsons, supra note 79.
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advertisements in search of class representatives 83 and individual plaintiffs
bringing multiple class actions in a single year.84
The Judiciary Committee believed that these state courts should not be
hearing "nationwide class actions," because it allows "one state court to
dictate to 49 others what their laws should be on a particular issue, thereby
undermining basic federalism principles." 85 The Judiciary Committee went
on to describe instances in which state courts-including Madison
County-applied their own state law on a variety of issues in a nationwide
class action. 86  This practice is not fundamentally unconstitutional
considering that relevant state law does not always conflict from state to
state. 87 However, the Committee believed "[t]he sentiment reflected in
these cases flies in the face of basic federalism principles by embracing the
view that other states should abide by a deciding court's law whenever it
decides that its own laws are preferable to other states' contrary policy
choices." 88
2. CAFA's Enactment Alters the Class Action Landscape
Part I.B.2 of this Note discusses CAFA's impact on class action
litigation. Part I.B.2.a briefly introduces the "Consumer Class Action Bill
of Rights" that increased regulation of class action settlements. More
pertinent to the scope of this Note, Part I.B.2.b addresses how CAFA
broadened diversity jurisdiction of class actions. Part I.B.2.c describes the
new removal statute governing class actions, and Part I.B.2.d examines
CAFA's legislative history, which suggests a change to the burden of
proving subject matter jurisdiction on a motion to remand after removal.
83. Id.
84. See Judicial Hellholes 2004, supra note 42, at 15.
85. Judiciary Committee Report on Class Action Fairness Act, S. Rep. No. 109-14, at
24, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 24.
86. Id., as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 24.
87. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 816 (1985) ("There can be no
injury in applying [forum] law if it is not in conflict with that of any other jurisdiction
connected to this suit."). In Shutts, the Court determined, however, that if forum law
conflicts with the law of another relevant state, the court could apply the forum law to the
entire nationwide class only if the state has "significant contact or significant aggregation of
contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair." Id. at 818. This choice-of-law standard is especially important due to
its implications on class certification. Federal appellate courts have often decertified
nationwide class actions when applying the law of each class member's state of domicile
would violate Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement. See, e.g., Andrews v. AT&T Co.,
95 F.3d 1014, 1023-24 (1 1th Cir. 1996); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 740-43
(5th Cir. 1996).
88. Judiciary Committee Report on Class Action Fairness Act, S. Rep. No. 109-14, at
26, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 26.
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a. CAFA Increases Judicial Regulation of Class Action Settlements
Labeled by Congress as a "Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights, 89
CAFA instituted four statutes intended to "address[] the problem of unfair
settlements and excessive attorneys' fees." 90 These new rules are distinct
from CAFA's diversity and removal provisions; they apply to all federal
class actions, regardless of which statute the parties invoked to satisfy
subject matter jurisdiction. 9 1 First, 28 U.S.C. § 1712 requires increased
scrutiny of coupon settlements, including regulation of the attorney's fees
arising from them.9 2 The statute allows the court to approve a proposed
coupon settlement, but only after "making a written finding that, the
settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate for class members. ' 93 Second,
28 U.S.C. § 1713 allows the court to strike any settlement "that would
result in a net loss to the class member. ' 94 Third, Congress sought to forbid
settlements that provide preferential payments to class members on the
basis of the proximity of their residence to the courthouse and no other
"legitimate legal basis."' 95 Therefore, Section 1714 prohibits courts from
approving settlements that provide greater monetary relief to class members
"solely on the basis... [of their] geographic proximity to the court."' 96
CAFA also instituted a strict notice requirement applicable to all class
action settlements. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1715, within ten days of the filing of
a class action settlement, the defendant must provide a copy of the
complaint, proposed settlement, and other applicable materials to the
appropriate state and federal officials. 97 This provision was intended to
"ensure that a responsible state and/or federal official.., is in a position to
react if the settlement appears unfair to some or all class members or
inconsistent with applicable regulatory policies. ' '9 8 The officials do not
89. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 3, 119 Stat. 4, 5-9 (to be
codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1711-15).
90. Judiciary Committee Report on Class Action Fairness Act, S. Rep. No. 109-14, at
27, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 27.
91. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1711 (2006) (defining a "class action" as "any civil action filed in
a district court of the United States under rule 23" or originally filed as a class action in a
state court and subsequently removed to a United States district court).
92. See id. § 1712(a)-(c). Most notably, the contingent fee arising from a coupon
settlement "shall be based on the value to class members of the coupons that are redeemed,"
instead of the value of the coupons issued. Id. § 1712(a).
93. Id. § 1712(e).
94. Id. § 1713 (directing the court to strike a settlement involving a payment to class
counsel that would result in a net loss unless "the court makes a written finding that
nonmonetary benefits to the class member substantially outweigh the monetary loss").
95. Judiciary Committee Report on Class Action Fairness Act, S. Rep. No. 109-14, at
32, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 31.
96. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1714.
97. See id. § 1715(b).
98. Judiciary Committee Report on Class Action Fairness Act, S. Rep. No. 109-14, at
32, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 32.
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have an affirmative duty to respond,99 but the court must provide the
officials ninety days to object before it gives final approval of a proposed
settlement.' 00
b. CAFA Expands Federal Jurisdiction over Class Actions
The key provision in Congress's effort to broaden the federal judiciary's
ability to adjudicate large class actions was the addition of 28 U.S.C. §
1332(d). The statute expands diversity jurisdiction over a class action,
broadly defined as "any civil action filed under rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure or similar State statute."10 1  Class plaintiffs can still
attempt to invoke diversity jurisdiction under section 1332. However, as an
alternative, federal subject matter jurisdiction now exists over class actions
where (1) the proposed class has over 100 members; (2) the aggregated
claims of class members exceed $5,000,000 exclusive of costs and interest;
and (3) any member of the class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a different state
from any defendant. 10 2 This statute changed two long-standing rules that
previously limited federal jurisdiction over class actions. CAFA adopted a
"minimal diversity" standard, departing from the long-standing requirement
of complete diversity between all named plaintiffs and defendants. 103 Also,
in otherwise qualifying actions, CAFA overturned Zahn v. International
Paper Co., which required every class plaintiff individually to fulfill the
requisite amount in controversy. 104
At first glance, this new diversity statute seems to sweep most large class
actions into federal court. However, CAFA also contains a number of
exceptions that permit class actions with a strong state interest to remain in
state court. 105 CAFA does not extend jurisdiction to any class action in
99. See id. at 28 ("Nothing in this section creates an affirmative duty for either the state
or federal officials to take any action in response to a class action settlement.").
100. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1715(d).
101. Id. § 1332(d)(1)(B).
102. See id. § 1332(d)(2)-(5); see also Hart v. FedEx Ground Package Sys. Inc., 457 F.3d
675, 679 (7th Cir. 2006); Plubell v. Merck & Co., 434 F.3d 1070, 1071 (8th Cir. 2006).
103. See Hart, 457 F.3d at 676-77 (discussing CAFA's minimal diversity standard);
Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions After the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 Tul. L.
Rev. 1593, 1595-96 (2006) (describing CAFA's diversity statute as a "minimal diversity
standard" because it requires only a single class member to reside in a different state from
that of any defendant); supra notes 16, 18 and accompanying text.
104. After the enactment of CAFA, the Supreme Court held, in Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Services, Inc., that a plaintiff who fails to satisfy the minimum amount in
controversy can establish jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 where the other elements of
diversity jurisdiction are present and at least one named plaintiff satisfies the amount-in-
controversy requirement. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. This change in
common law is often inconsequential for class action litigation because of the new diversity
requirements imposed by CAFA, but is an important change for class actions that cannot
confer jurisdiction under CAFA, yet fulfill the traditional diversity requirements under §
1332(a).
105. Hart, 457 F.3d at 677 ("Congress decided to qualify this rule of minimal diversity,
however, for class actions that were essentially local in nature."). Additionally, CAFA
2759
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
which "the primary defendants are States, State officials, or other
governmental entities against whom the district court may be foreclosed
from ordering relief."'10 6
In addition, CAFA does not grant diversity jurisdiction to actions in
which more than two-thirds of the proposed class members and all "primary
defendants"' 1 7 are "citizens of the State in which the class action was
originally filed."'10 8 Dubbed the "home state exception,"' 1 9 this provision
allows state courts to decide issues between local parties in which "local
interests.., presumably would predominate." 110 CAFA created a similar
carve-out that provides the district court discretion whether to hear the case.
If the "primary defendants" are citizens of the state in which the action was
brought and the number of in-state class members only amounts to between
one-third and two-thirds of the entire class, then diversity jurisdiction
exists, but the district court may decline to exercise that jurisdiction in the
interest of justice."I ' In this event, the statute directs the district court to
"look[] at the totality of the circumstances" to determine whether the action
is predominately local in character."l 2
excludes class actions solely involving securities or state-law corporate governance claims
because these cases already have distinct diversity requirements under the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(9); see Judiciary
Committee Report on Class Action Fairness Act, S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 45 (2005), as
reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 42; see also Williams v. Tex. Commerce Trust Co. of
N.Y., No. 05-1070-CV, 2006 WL 1696681, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Jun. 15, 2006) (finding that the
court "does not have jurisdiction under the CAFA over the multiple state law claims asserted
by the Plaintiffs, all of which arise out of the rights, duties (including fiduciary duties) and
obligations owed the Plaintiffs by the Defendants" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
106. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(5)(A). This provision prevents government agents from
removing a case to federal court and then arguing that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits the
court from granting relief. See Judiciary Committee Report on Class Action Fairness Act, S.
Rep. No. 109-14, at 42, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 40; Sarah S. Vance, A Primer
on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 Tul. L. Rev. 1617, 1621 (2006).
107. The statute does not define the term "primary defendants." However, the Senate
Judiciary Committee considered "primary defendants" to be "those defendants who are the
real 'targets' of the lawsuit... [and have] substantial exposure to significant portions of the
proposed class." Judiciary Committee Report on Class Action Fairness Act, S. Rep. No. 109-
14, at 43, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 41; cf Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV
05-5644, 2005 WL 3967998, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2005) (defining "primary defendant"
as "any [defendant] with direct liability to the plaintiffs").
108. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(4)(B).
109. Judiciary Committee Report on Class Action Fairness Act, S. Rep. No. 109-14, at
28, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 28.
110. Id. at 36, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 35.
111. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(3).
112. Id.; see also Judiciary Committee Report on Class Action Fairness Act, S. Rep. No.
109-14, at 36, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 35. The statute provides six factors to
guide the court's decision: (1) whether the claims involve matters of national interest; (2)
whether the claims will be governed by the law of the forum state; (3) whether the action
was pleaded "in a manner that seeks to avoid [f]ederal jurisdiction"; (4) whether the forum
has a "distinct nexus with the class members, the alleged harm, or the defendants"; (5)
whether the number of in-state class members is substantially larger than number of class
members from any other state; and (6) whether another class action "asserting the same or
similar claims" has been filed within the last three years. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(3)(A)-(F).
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CAFA also contains a "local controversy exception," which forces the
district court to decline jurisdiction under similar circumstances. 113 This
carve-out allows state courts to adjudicate many local controversies that
would otherwise fall under the "home state exception," but contain at least
one out-of-state defendant. 114 The proposed class action must fulfill four
requirements to fall within this exception: (1) Greater than two-thirds of
the class members are citizens of the state in which the action was
originally brought; (2) at least one defendant from which "significant relief
is sought" and "whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis" for the
asserted claims is a citizen of the state in which the action was brought; (3)
the "principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or any related
conduct of each defendant" occurred in the forum state; and (4) no other
class action involving similar factual allegations was filed against any of the
same defendants in the past three years."15
c. CAFA Modifies Removal
By broadening federal jurisdiction over class actions, CAFA naturally
expanded a class action defendant's opportunities to remove a state class
action to federal court. Additionally, CAFA eliminated several long-
standing barriers to removal through the creation of a new removal statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1453.
First, Congress sought to prevent plaintiffs from including claims against
an in-state defendant for the sole purpose of avoiding removal. 116
Therefore, CAFA now allows the removal of a class action "in accordance
with section 1446 ... without regard to whether any defendant is a citizen
of the State in which the action is brought."" 17
Second, CAFA allows the removal of a class action "without the consent
of all defendants."' 18 This provision prevents plaintiffs from "join[ing] a
defendant who might be willing to break with other defendants as to
removal, or negotiat[ing] favorably with a defendant who would oppose
removal."' 19
113. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(4)(A); Judiciary Committee Report on Class Action
Fairness Act, S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 28, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 28 (creating
the term "Local Controversy Exception").
114. Judiciary Committee Report on Class Action Fairness Act, S. Rep. No. 109-14, at
28-29, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 28.
115. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(4)(A); see Hart v. FedEx Ground Package Sys. Inc., 457 F.3d
675, 679 (7th Cir. 20.06).
116. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
117. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1453(b); see Prime Care of N.E. Kan., LLC v. Humana Ins. Co., 447
F.3d 1284, 1284 (10th Cir. 2006).
118. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1453(b); see Braud v. Transp. Serv. Co. of Ill., 445 F.3d 801, 808 (5th
Cir. 2006).
119. Sherman, supra note 103, at 1604.
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Third, CAFA eliminated the prohibition on removal of a diversity class
action to federal court more than one year after the action commenced. 20
Under CAFA, removal is available at any stage of the case, as long as
notice is filed within thirty days from the date the case became
removable. 12 1  Since the statute directs the judge only to look at the
diversity requirements at the time of removal, defendants could presumably
remove after a pretrial motion that dismisses a portion of the class and
reduces the number of in-state plaintiffs to the point which the "home-state
exception" no longer applies. 122
Historically the grant of a motion to remand a case back to the state court
from which it was removed could not be appealed. 123 However, CAFA's
removal statute allows discretionary, interlocutory appellate review by the
Court of Appeals. 124 The statute imposes tight deadlines for review to
prevent a lengthy delay in the case. 125 An appeal must be filed within
seven days of the district court's order on the motion to remand. 126 In
addition, if the court of appeals decides to take the appeal, it must render a
decision within sixty days of the date on which the appeal was filed. 127
CAFA also contains a statutory provision that does not involve
traditional class actions: The Act gives a district court removal jurisdiction
over large actions that were filed jointly in a state court under a common
question of law or fact. Section 1332(d)(11)(B) defines a "mass action" as
"any civil action[] in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons
are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims
120. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1453(b); see Braud, 445 F.3d at 806; supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000) ("If the case stated by the initial pleading is not
removable, a notice of removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant,
through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper
from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become
removable ... ").
122. See McLaughlin, supra note 39, at 12-28.
123. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) ("An order remanding a case to the State court from which
it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except [for civil rights cases
removed under section 1443].").
124. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1453(c).
125. Sherman, supra note 103, at 1605.
126. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1453(c)(1). Section 1453(c)(1) states that that the appeal must be
made "not less than 7 days after entry of the order." If applied literally, an appeal could be
dismissed for being filed too early, but there would be no deadline to appeal after the seven
days has passed. Courts have assumed that the statute contains a typographical error and
held that the statute should be read to require an application of appeal to be made no more
than seven days after entry of the order. See, e.g., Morgan v. Gay, 466 F.3d 276, 279 (3d Cir.
2006) (reading the statute as "not more than" because that "accurately reflects the
uncontested intent of Congress"); Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw
Transit Servs., Inc., 435 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2006) (same); Pritchett v. Office Depot,
Inc., 420 F.3d 1090, 1093 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005) (same).
127. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1453(c)(2). The 60-day period for judgment may be extended for up
to 10 days for good cause, or for any period of time if agreed upon by all parties. Id. §
1453(c)(3).
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involve common questions of law or fact."'1 28 This type of action is deemed
removable under CAFA if it fulfills CAFA's diversity requirements set
forth in section 1332(d)(2)-(10).1 29 However, the statute also ties mass
actions to the traditional amount in controversy, providing that "jurisdiction
shall exist only over those plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action satisfy
the jurisdictional amount requirements under [28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)]."'1 30
The clumsy drafting of the statute has many questioning the scope of the
mass action provision.131 Since the mass action statute intermingles the
new diversity statute under CAFA and the traditional diversity requirements
of section 1332(a), strange situations could potentially arise. For example,
an action with hundreds of plaintiffs could be removed with only a handful
of plaintiffs that independently fulfill section 1332(a), leaving a "mass
action" in federal court with little mass. 132 With little insight from federal
courts, it is unclear how this provision will operate in future cases. 133
d. Legislative History Points to a New Standard for the Burden of Proof
CAFA's text does not address which party bears the burden of
establishing federal jurisdiction when a qualifying class action or mass
action is removed to federal court. Placing the burden of proving CAFA's
diversity requirements on the plaintiff during a motion to remand would be
consistent with CAFA's intent to broaden diversity jurisdiction. Under that
burden allocation, when the class size or amount in controversy is
ambiguous, a class action would remain in federal court unless plaintiffs
could make an affirmative showing that removal was improper. Despite the
facial silence of the statute and the near-canonical common law rule that the
party seeking removal bears the burden of proof on the issue of federal
jurisdiction, two pieces of CAFA's legislative history assert that the Act
was intended to place the burden on the party resisting removal.
128. Id. § 1332(d)(l l)(B)(i).
129. Id. § 1332(d)(l1)(A).
130. Id. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).
131. See Linda S. Mullenix, CAFA Mass Actions, Nat'l L.J., May 1, 2006, at 12.
132. Id. It is unclear how a court would handle this hypothetical situation if the aggregate
of the remaining plaintiffs' claims fell short of CAFA's requirement of at least 100 plaintiffs
and $5,000,000 in controversy.
133. In Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2006), the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was the first appellate court to address the mass action
provision. Mullenix, supra note 131, at 12. The court remanded the action on other grounds,
but analyzed the "bewildering" language of the mass action statute in lengthy dicta. See
Abrego Abrego, 443 F.3d at 686-90. Providing more questions than answers, the court
discussed many of the provisions that "make no sense." See id. at 680 n.6, 686-90; Mullenix,
supra note 131, at 12. The Northern District of Alabama discovered the same problem in
Lowery v. Honeywell International, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d. 1288 (N.D. Ala. 2006). The court
did not untie "this Gordian knot," but found a lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
section (d)(l 1)(b) because plaintiffs' claims were less than the $75,000 requirement of 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a). Id. at 1293-94.
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The Chairman of the United States House Committee on the Judiciary,
Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, inserted the House Sponsors'
Statement into the congressional record when the House convened to vote
on CAFA on February 17, 2005. The statement was not read on the floor of
Congress in general debate prior to voting, but it was simply inserted into
the record due to time constraints. 134 The statement aimed to "provide a
brief summary of the provisions in Sections 4 and 5 of [CAFA]" and to
"explain[] how the bill is to work... relative to the intent of the
managers."' 135 It read in part:
Overall, new section 1332(d) is intended to expand substantially Federal
court jurisdiction over class actions. Its provisions should be read
broadly, with a strong preference that interstate class actions should be
heard in a Federal court if removed by any defendant. If a purported class
action is removed under these jurisdictional provisions, the named
plaintiff(s) should bear the burden of demonstrating that the removal was
improper. And if a Federal court is uncertain about whether the $5
million threshold is satisfied, the court should err in favor of exercising
jurisdiction over the case. 136
Congressman Sensenbrenner reiterated this position in the general debate
prior to the vote. He stated,
The sponsors intend this subsection to be interpreted broadly, and if a
purported class action is removed under this provision, the plaintiff shall
bear the burden of demonstrating that the $5 million threshold is not
satisfied. By the same token, if a Federal court is uncertain about whether
a case puts $5 million or more in controversy, the court should favor
exercising jurisdiction over the case.137
No Senators mentioned CAFA's burden of proof during the Senate's
general debate. However, on February 28, 2005, ten days after CAFA's
enactment, the Senate Judiciary Committee published its report on the Act,
explaining CAFA's content and purpose. There were a few passages within
the ninety-five-page report that also suggested that CAFA placed the
burden of refuting diversity jurisdiction on the plaintiff resisting removal.
The report read as follows:
If a purported class action is removed pursuant to these jurisdictional
provisions, the named plaintiff(s) should bear the burden of demonstrating
that the removal was improvident (i.e., that the applicable jurisdictional
requirements are not satisfied). And if a federal court is uncertain about
whether "all matters in controversy" in a purported class action "do not in
the aggregate exceed the sum or value of $5,000,000," the court should
err in favor of exercising jurisdiction over the case.
134. 151 Cong. Rec. H723, H727 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 151 Cong. Rec. H730.
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As noted above, it is the intent of the Committee that the named
plaintiff(s) should bear the burden of demonstrating that a case should be
remanded to state court (e.g., the burden of demonstrating that more than
two-thirds of the proposed class members are citizens of the forum state).
Allocating the burden in this manner is important to ensure that the named
plaintiffs will not be able to evade federal jurisdiction with vague class
definitions or other efforts to obscure the citizenship of class members.
•.. [I]f a plaintiff seeks to have a purported class action remanded for
lack of federal diversity jurisdiction under subsection 1332(d)(5)(B)
("limited scope" class actions), that plaintiff should have the burden of
demonstrating that "all matters in controversy" do not "in the aggregate
exceed the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs" or
that "the number of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is less
than 100.138
Both pieces of legislative history clearly state that, under CAFA, plaintiffs
should bear the burden of proving that diversity jurisdiction is lacking.
However, neither statement points to any language within CAFA to support
the proposition, nor do they acknowledge that this standard would overturn
long-standing precedent.
C. The Weight Given to CAFA's Legislative History May Determine the
Burden Allocation
A court facing the issue of which party should bear the burden of proving
CAFA's diversity requirements must decide whether to follow the
traditional rule in the absence of statutory language to the contrary, or to
defer to CAFA's legislative history. But, in general, how reliable is
legislative history, and is it enough to overturn well-established law? There
has been a long-standing debate among legal academics, as well as current
Supreme Court Justices, concerning the proper use of extrinsic sources in
statutory interpretation. On one side of the table, led by Supreme Court
Justice Antonin Scalia, are those who advocate a "textualist" or plain
meaning approach. 139 Others, including Justice Stephen Breyer, endorse
the consultation of extrinsic sources to reach the true purpose of a statute. 140
Part I.C of this Note discusses the opposing views on statutory
interpretation, and concludes with an examination of the Supreme Court's
recent treatment of legislative history, including the situation, as in CAFA,
where the text is completely silent on the issue.
138. Judiciary Committee Report on Class Action Fairness Act, S. Rep. No. 109-14, at
42-44, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 40-42 (quoting sections of CAFA).
139. See infra Part I.C.2.
140. See infra Part I.C.1.
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1. Subjective Approaches: Intentionalism and Purposivism
The statutory system has drawbacks-drafters cannot address all possible
situations and occasionally create textual ambiguities. Therefore, many
legal theorists follow a mode of statutory interpretation that, rather than
strictly applying the text, seeks to reach the legislative intent
("intentionalism"), or purpose ("purposivism"), behind a statute.141
Advocates of this method argue that statutory language is often unclear, and
therefore in order to apply a statute properly, a court must consult extrinsic
sources, including legislative history, to determine how Congress meant the
statute to be understood. 142 Naturally, some theorists use legislative history
more liberally than others-some intentionalists will always consult
legislative history, according more authority to clear congressional intent
than clear statutory text, while others will only consult legislative history if
the statutory text is ambiguous, ending their analysis if the statutory
language is completely clear.' 43 Regardless, there is a strong contingent of
jurists, including Justice Breyer, who generally believe that statutory
interpretation should begin with an examination of the text, but follow with
"a second level of interpretive investigation" with use of extrinsic sources
"to fully flesh out the statutory context."144
The Supreme Court has a long history of consulting legislative history.
In the 1892 case of Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,145 the
Supreme Court overturned a long-standing rule that prohibited the use of
141. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey & Elizabeth Garrett,
Legislation and Statutory Interpretation 219, 228 (2d ed. 2006) (explaining intentionalism
and purposivism). These theories can be classified further and differ on many levels, none
of which are particularly relevant to this Note. See, e.g., Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Moderate
versus Strong Intentionalism: Knapp and Michaels Revisited, 42 San Diego L. Rev. 669
(2005); John F. Manning, What Divides Textualistsfrom Purposivists?, 106 Colum. L. Rev.
70 (2006).
142. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65
S. Cal. L. Rev. 845, 847 (1991). Many sources of legislative history can be used to find
congressional intent, including committee reports, sponsor statements, floor statements,
rejected bills, statements by a non-legislative drafter, and subsequent history. William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 637-40 (1990); see Christian E.
Mammen, Using Legislative History in American Statutory Interpretation 61-75 (2002).
143. Compare Carlos E. Gonzdles, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L.
Rev. 585, 605-06 (1996) (discussing "law as legislative intent" intentionalism-under which
theory, "where both the text of a statute and the enacting Congress's intent are clear but
contradict one another, the clear intent of the enacting Congress prevails"), and Patricia M.
Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the
1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 Am. U. L. Rev. 277, 301-02 (1990)
(stating that judges should always seek a statute's intent because the text is rarely clear), with
Breyer, supra note 142, at 848-61 (advocating the use of legislative history when a statute is
unclear).
144. Mammen, supra note 142, at 169.
145. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
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legislative history to trump contrary statutory text. 146 Five years earlier, the
Holy Trinity Church of New York contracted with an English minister to
move to New York to become the church's rector and pastor. 147 The
United States prosecuted the Holy Trinity Church in the Southern District
of New York for this arrangement under the Alien Contract Labor Act of
1885, which made it unlawful to "assist or encourage the importation or
migration of any ... foreigner[], into the United States ... under
contract... to perform labor or service of any kind."' 48 The Court found
that the church's actions violated the text of the Act, but noted that "a thing
may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because
not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers."'1 49 The Court
consulted the Alien Contract Labor Act's legislative history, and reversed
the conviction because it concluded that the statute was enacted to prevent
the exploitation of cheap labor, which was not present in the case at bar.150
In Holy Trinity, the Court relied on several sources to interpret the Alien
Contract Labor Act, but the congressional committee reports have been
seen to have "provided the best support."'' 1 Equivalently, in a matter of
statutory interpretation, the Court will often have multiple legislative
sources at its disposal, yet the Court has consistently considered certain
types of legislative history as far more influential than others. 152 The
reports that accompany a bill to the floor of the House or Senate are the
most frequently referenced type of legislative history.' 53 Although these
reports do not have the force of law, 154 the Court has found that when it
chooses to consult a statute's legislative history, committee reports are the
most reliable source of congressional intent.155  Since the committee
146. See id. at 459; Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial
Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1833, 1835, 1887-
88 (1998) (discussing statutory interpretation before Holy Trinity).
147. Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 457-58.
148. Id. at 458.
149. Id. at 459.
150. See id. at 465 ("We find, therefore, that the title of the act, the evil which was
intended to be remedied, the circumstances surrounding the appeal to Congress, the reports
of the committee of each house, all concur in affirming that the intent of Congress was
simply to stay the influx of this cheap unskilled labor.").
151. See Vermuele, supra note 146, at 1842-44 (citing Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 462-65).
152. See Michael Sinclair, Guide to Statutory Interpretation 111-12 (2000) (listing many
sources of legislative history and noting that "[n]o list of kinds of extrinsic resource should
pretend to be exhaustive"); Eskridge, Frickey & Garrett, supra note 141, at 310-11
(discussing the "hierarchy of legislative history sources").
153. See Sinclair, supra note 152, at 112; Eskridge, Frickey & Garrett, supra note 141, at
311 ("Almost half the Supreme Court's references to legislative history are to committee
reports .... ).
154. City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 345 n.7 (1994) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("The purpose of a committee report is to provide the Members of Congress who
have not taken part in the committee's deliberations with a summary of the provisions of the
bill and the reasons for the committee's recommendation that the bill should become law.
The report obviously does not have the force of law.").
155. Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 n.7 (1986) ("[The Supreme Court] ha[s]
repeatedly recognized that the authoritative source for legislative intent lies in the Committee
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members are "in some sense advocates for the bill," typically the reports are
reliably indicative of the statute's scope and content. 156 A committee report
also carries strength in numbers. Justice Harlan stated in Zuber v. Allen,157
that unlike the statement of a single legislator, "[a] committee report
represents the considered and collective understanding of those
Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation.") 58
Although not as persuasive as committee reports, the Supreme Court has
often consulted the bill sponsor's (the Congressman that proposed the bill)
explanatory statements to Congress as reliable indicia of congressional
intent. 159 These statements are deemed particularly credible because, like
committee members, the sponsors are well apprised of the details of the bill.
Since a misstatement by the sponsor may have political ramifications, 160
other Congressmen "pay special heed to their characterizations of the
legislation."' 161
Outside of committee reports and sponsor statements, "the reliability of
legislative history falls off markedly."'162  The Supreme Court has
occasionally interpreted a statute with the aid of a statement by a single
legislator during congressional debate, often referred to as a "floor
statement," 163 but the Court is generally wary of relying on the opinion of a
Reports on the bill."); Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (stating that "the
authoritative source for finding the Legislature's intent lies in the Committee Reports on the
bill").
156. Mammen, supra note 142, at 62-63 (listing reasons why committee reports are more
useful than other types of legislative history); Sinclair, supra note 152, at 112 ("Committees
distill their expertise, investigations, internal debates, and resolutions in their reports.").
157. 396 U.S. 168 (1969).
158. Id. at 186.
159. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568, 584-88 (1988) ("It is the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the
statutory words is in doubt." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bowsher v. Merck & Co.,
460 U.S. 824, 832-33 (1983) (following the statements of the House sponsor to deduce
congressional intent); N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 525-27 (1982) (noting
that the Senate sponsor's statement served as an "authoritative guide to the statute's
construction").
160. See Eskridge, Frickey & Garrett, supra note 141, at 312-13 ("The speakers are
motivated to be truthful because any overstatement may be seized upon by opponents or
corrected by the speaker's allies. Moreover, if a sponsor misrepresents the deal in an
important way, her reputation may suffer, and with it her effectiveness as a legislator.").
161. Eskridge, supra note 142, at 638.
162. Eskridge, Frickey & Garrett, supra note 141, at 313.
163. The Supreme Court has only utilized these statements in limited circumstances, such
as when there is a consensus between floor statements, there are no other sources of
legislative history available, or the statements support conclusions already discerned from
the statute's text. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2767 n.10 (2006) ("We
note that statements made by Senators preceding passage of the Act lend further support to
what the text of the DTA and its drafting history already make plain."); Reves v. Ernst &
Young, 507 U.S. 170, 182 (1993) (citing floor statements because the Congressmen
consistently described a subsection of a statute in the same manner); Metro. Wash. Airports
Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 267 (1991)
("Although the legislative history is not necessary to our conclusion that the Board members
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single legislator as an authoritative statement of congressional intent.' 64
Since statements uttered in congressional debate often conflict, and only
represent the view of a single, perhaps uninformed, legislator on an isolated
issue, relying on a floor statement poses a great risk of producing an
inaccurate indication of true congressional intent.165
2. An Objective Approach: Textualism
The textualist approach to statutory interpretation draws a statute's
meaning primarily from its language. 166 Adopting an objective approach,
textualists believe that courts should simply "ascertain[] from the text the
meaning 'most in accord with context and ordinary usage,"' rather than
inferring the statute's meaning in light of its legislative history. 167 This
method treats all forms of legislative history as of limited reliability, but
often makes use of dictionaries, canons of construction, grammar books, or
other reference sources to decipher the appropriate meaning of the statutory
terms. 168
Although textualists strongly discourage reliance on legislative history,
many, like Justice Scalia, take a relatively flexible approach under certain
circumstances. Justice Scalia has considered a statute's legislative history
in the event of a drafter's error or when a strict application of the text would
yield absurd results. 169
act in their official congressional capacities, the floor debates in the House confirm our
view."); see also Manmen, supra note 142, at 69-70.
164. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 224 (1980) ("The Court has
often warned that in construing statutes, we should be extremely wary of testimony before
committee hearings and of debates on the floor of Congress save for precise analyses of
statutory phrases by the sponsors of the proposed laws." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
165. See Mammen, supra note 142, at 68; Eskridge, Frickey & Garrett, supra note 141, at
313.
166. See Mammen, supra note 142, at 155 ("Textualism's central tenet is that the focus of
statutory interpretation should be the statutory text that was duly enacted according to
constitutional procedures."); Gregory E. Maggs, Reconciling Textualism and the Chevron
Doctrine: In Defense of Justice Scalia, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 393, 396 (1996) ("[T]extualists
consider the exact wording of a statute the primary basis for determining the statute's
meaning.").
167. Maggs, supra note 166, at 396 (citing Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490
U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the
Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 351, 352 (1994).
168. See Eskridge, supra note 142, at 669 (describing reference materials consulted by
textualists); see also Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 719 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (using a canon of construction to determine the meaning of the text); Crandon v.
United States, 494 U.S. 152, 171-72 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (consulting Webster's
Second New International Dictionary to interpret statutory terms).
169. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 82 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("I have been willing, in the case of civil statutes, to acknowledge a doctrine of
"scrivener's error" that permits a court to give an unusual (though not unheard-of) meaning
to a word which, if given its normal meaning, would produce an absurd and arguably
unconstitutional result."); see also Mammen, supra note 142, at 158.
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In his Supreme Court opinions, Justice Scalia has expounded three main
arguments against the use of legislative history to ascertain congressional
intent. First, he has contended that according authority to legislative history
is unconstitutional. His argument is based on Article I, Section 7 of the
U.S. Constitution, which provides that text only becomes law if it is
bicamerally approved and signed by the President in the same textual
form. 170 Scalia believes that courts should defer to this constitutionally
mandated lawmaking process, and therefore all congressional statements
absent from the text of the enacted statute should not be given the force of
law or consulted as evidence of the law.17 Second, Scalia has criticized the
reliability of legislative history as an indicator of congressional intent. He
has found it presumptuous to impute the views of a single committee to the
majority of Congress, 172 especially since most statements go unread by the
majority of Congress 173 and can often be attributed to the recommendations
of a lobbyist to influence judicial construction, rather than providing a
good-faith attempt to explain the statute's meaning. 174 Third, Scalia has
disapproved of the judiciary's selective use of legislative history. He finds
legislative history often to be a fagade since a judge does not always have to
170. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7.
171. Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 621 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("All we know for sure is that the full Senate adopted the text that we have before us here, as
did the full House, pursuant to the procedures prescribed by the Constitution; and that that
text, having been transmitted to the President and approved by him, again pursuant to the
procedures prescribed by the Constitution, became law.... [W]e should try to give the text
its fair meaning, whatever various committees might have had to say-thereby affirming the
proposition that we are a Government of laws, not of committee reports. That is, at least, the
way I prefer to proceed."); see also Eskridge, Frickey & Garrett, supra note 141, at 236.
172. Mortier, 501 U.S. at 620 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[The Committee Report] does not
necessarily say anything about what Congress as a whole thought. Assuming that all the
members of the three Committees in question (as opposed to just the relevant
Subcommittees) actually adverted to the interpretive point at issue here-which is probably
an unrealistic assumption-and assuming further that they were in unanimous agreement on
the point, they would still represent less than two-fifths of the Senate, and less than one-tenth
of the House.").
173. Id. ("It is most unlikely that many Members of either Chamber read the pertinent
portions of the Committee Reports before voting on the bill-assuming (we cannot be sure)
that the Reports were available before the vote."); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I am confident that only a small proportion of the Members
of Congress read either one of the Committee Reports in question, even if (as is not always
the case) the Reports happened to have been published before the vote; that very few of
those who did read them set off for the nearest law library to check out what was actually
said in the four cases at issue (or in the more than 50 other cases cited by the House and
Senate Reports) .... ").
174. Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 98 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("As anyone familiar with
modem-day drafting of congressional committee reports is well aware, the [referenced
portion of the committee report] w[as] inserted, at best by a committee staff member on his
or her own initiative, and at worst by a committee staff member at the suggestion of a
lawyer-lobbyist; and the purpose of those references was not primarily to inform the
Members of Congress what the bill meant.., but rather to influence judicial construction.").
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follow a statute's legislative history, but, when favorable, many will "use it
as a subterfuge to hide" the policy reasons for their decision. 175
3. Statutory Interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Scalia's textualist practices have altered Supreme Court
jurisprudence.' 76 Before Justice Scalia's appointment to the Supreme Court
in the mid 1980s, the Court routinely consulted legislative history in matters
of statutory interpretation. 177 In Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research
Group, Inc., a pre-Scalia case, the Court even suggested that a Court of
Appeals was in error for "exclud[ing] reference to the legislative history of
[a statute] in discerning its meaning."' 178 However, the Court has shifted to
an objective approach in recent years.
For example, in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah, the Supreme Court
settled a split within the U.S. Courts of Appeals over the reach of
supplemental jurisdiction in diversity actions and held that 28 U.S.C. §
1367 grants subject matter jurisdiction over a plaintiff in a multiparty action
who fails to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement, as long as the
other elements are present and at least one named plaintiff satisfies the
amount in controversy. 179 The Court refused to follow the House Judiciary
Committee Report on the Judicial Improvements Act, which suggested an
alternative.180 Speaking for the Court, Justice Kennedy explained that the
Court does not consult legislative history in situations, such as in
Allapattah, where the statute is not ambiguous.' 8 1 He stated, "As we have
repeatedly held, the authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the
legislative history or any other extrinsic material. Extrinsic materials have a
role in statutory interpretation only to the extent they shed a reliable light on
175. Mammen, supra note 142, at 164-65; see Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S.
200, 219 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[The majority] serves to maintain the illusion that
legislative history is an important factor in this Court's deciding of cases, as opposed to an
omnipresent makeweight for decisions arrived at on other grounds."); Mortier, 501 U.S. at
617 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[The lower court's] only mistake was failing to recognize how
unreliable Committee Reports are-not only as a genuine indicator of congressional intent
but as a safe predictor of judicial construction. We use them when it is convenient, and
ignore them when it is not.").
176. Sinclair, supra note 152, at 109 ("At present, judicial practice [involving statutory
interpretation] seems to be coalescing around a position somewhat like Justice Scalia's.").
177. Id. (noting that the Court had abandoned the plain meaning rule until it was revived
by Justice Scalia); Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in
the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 195, 197-200 (1983) (noting that the Court
consulted legislative history in nearly every case of the 1981 term involving a matter of
statutory interpretation).
178. Train v. Colo. Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1976).
179. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2615 (2005);
supra note 21 and accompanying text.
180. Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2625.
181. Id. ("The proponents of the alternative view of § 1367 insist that the statute is at least
ambiguous and that we should look to other interpretive tools .... We can reject this
argument at the very outset simply because § 1367 is not ambiguous.").
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the enacting Legislature's understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms."' 82
Following a line of reasoning employed by Scalia in the past, Kennedy also
stated that legislative history is unreliable because it can be "murky,
ambiguous, and contradictory," and also gives "power... to strategic
manipul[ators] ... to secure results they were unable to achieve through the
statutory text." 183
As shown in Allapattah, the Supreme Court will rarely consult legislative
history to interpret a statute unless its enacted text is ambiguous. 184
However, a new problem arises, as in CAFA's burden of proof, where the
statute is completely silent. Some courts construe statutory silence on a
particular issue as reflecting ambiguity within the text; other courts see it as
reflecting congressional intent not to legislate on the subject at issue.1 85
In at least one instance, the pre-Scalia Supreme Court consulted a
statute's legislative history when the statute was otherwise silent on a
particular issue. In Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, the Court faced the
question of whether Coming violated the Equal Pay Act by paying male
night-shift workers a higher wage than female day-shift workers.186 Prior
to deciding the major issues on appeal, Justice Thurgood Marshall stated
that "[a]lthough the Act is silent on [burden allocation], its legislative
history makes plain that the Secretary [of Labor] has the burden of proof on
this issue, as both of the courts below recognized."' 187 The Court did not
provide any additional analysis on the issue, but applied the burden
accordingly.188 However, it is not evident whether the Court truly deferred
to the legislative history in light of statutory silence, considering that the
Court also noted that this burden allocation was consistent with precedent
under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 189
182. Id. at 2626.
183. Id.; see supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
184. For other examples of the Supreme Court refusing to consult legislative history when
the statute is unambiguous, see United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997) ("Given the
straightforward statutory command, there is no reason to resort to legislative history.");
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994) ("[Wie do not resort to legislative
history to cloud a statutory text that is clear."); Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249,
254 (1992) ("When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then .. judicial inquiry is
complete." (internal quotation marks omitted)). But see Zedner v. United States, 126 S. Ct.
1976, 1985-86 (2006) (examining a statute's legislative history to confirm the decision that
the Court had already reached on other grounds).
185. Compare US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 420-21 (2002) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (construing statutory silence as ambiguity and subsequently consulting the
legislative history), and Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Ewing, 439 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th
Cir. 2006) ("The Tax Court correctly set forth the principle that, if the statute is ambiguous
or silent, the court then may look to legislative history in order to determine congressional
intent."), with United States v. Thigpen, 4 F.3d 1573, 1577 (11 th Cir. 1993) (claiming no
authority to enforce principles within a statute's legislative history "[i]n the absence of any
statutory provision addressing the issue").
186. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 194-95 (1974).
187. Id. at 195 (footnote omitted).
188. Id. at 196.
189. See id. at 196-97.
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Twenty years later, the Supreme Court interpreted statutory silence as a
clear showing that Congress chose not to legislate on the issue in question.
In Shannon v. United States, the Supreme Court faced the issue of whether
a federal district court is "required to instruct the jury regarding the
consequences to the defendant of a verdict of 'not guilty by reason of
insanity' ... under the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 [(IDRA)].' 9 °
Prior to the IDRA's enactment, federal courts did not recognize a verdict of
"not guilty by reason of insanity"-if a defendant established an insanity
defense, the jury would simply find him "not guilty."' 191 In addition, prior
to the IDRA, trial judges in the vast majority of federal circuits could not
give jurors any information regarding what would happen to a defendant
after an insanity acquittal-for example, whether the defendant would be
permanently admitted for psychiatric treatment in a mental institution. 192
The IDRA did not provide any explicit directive as to whether a district
judge should instruct jurors on the consequences of a "not guilty only by
reason of insanity" verdict. 193 However, the IDRA's Senate Committee
Report endorsed the practice previously used by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, which gave the judge discretion
whether to instruct the jury on the effect of a "not guilty by reason of
insanity" verdict. 194
The Court ultimately ignored the legislative history and held that no
instruction should be given to the jury as a matter of practice. 195 Writing
for the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas noted that the Court has often
disagreed over the role of legislative history in statutory interpretation, but
that he was not aware of any case in which the Court has "given
authoritative weight to a single passage of legislative history that is in no
way anchored in the text of the statute."' 96 Justice Thomas stressed that the
text was completely silent as to the issue of jury instructions, and therefore,
in order "[t]o give effect to this snippet of legislative history, [the Court]
would have to abandon altogether the text of the statute as a guide in the
interpretative process."' 197 Quoting the D.C. Circuit, the Court held that
"courts have no authority to enforce a principle gleaned solely from
legislative history that has no statutory reference point."' 198
190. Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 575 (1994).
191. Id. at 575.
192. Id. at 576.
193. Id. at 580.
194. Id. at 583.
195. Id. at 587.
196. Id. at 583.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 584 (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d
697, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (alterations omitted)).
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II. COURTS DIFFER ON THE CAFA REMOVAL BURDEN
Considering the conflicting theories regarding statutory interpretation, it
is not surprising that there has been some disagreement over whether
CAFA's legislative history should be given effect absent any relevant
statutory provision. Indeed, district courts initially split over whether
CAFA places the burden of proving its diversity requirements on the
proponent of remand. However, after Judge Frank Easterbrook of the
Seventh Circuit weighed in on the issue in Brill v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc.,1 99 saying that more than "naked legislative history" is needed
to overturn the long-standing burden precedent, courts have subsequently
followed the Supreme Court's treatment of statutory silence in Shannon
when analyzing CAFA and have placed the burden of proof on the
proponent of remand. 200 Part II of this Note examines the federal court
decisions that have ruled on this issue. Part II.A introduces the decisions
that have placed the burden on the plaintiff to prove that removal is
improper. Part II.B examines Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Brill and
discusses its impact on other federal courts.
A. District Courts Flip the Burden in Favor of Federal Jurisdiction
1. Central District of California's First Stance: Berry v. American Express
Publishing Corp.
In March 2005, a plaintiff filed a class action complaint in the Superior
Court of California alleging that defendant American Express unlawfully
charged cardholders for unsolicited magazine subscriptions in violation of
several California state statutes. 20 1 Less than a month later, American
Express took advantage of CAFA and filed a notice of removal in the
District Court for the Central District of California.20 2 The plaintiff then
filed a motion for remand on the ground that the defendant could not show
that the amount in controversy exceeded $5,000,000.203 The defendants
claimed that recovery could exceed $5,000,000 and, additionally, urged the
court to follow the legislative history and "shift the burden to plaintiff to
show that removal is improper. '20 4 The district court recognized that it was
the first to rule on whether CAFA shifted the burden of proof to plaintiffs in
order to favor federal jurisdiction. 205 It ultimately held that placing the
199. 427 F.3d 446, 447 (7th Cir. 2005).
200. See infra Part II.B.2.
201. Berry v. Am. Express Publ'g Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1120 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
202. Id.
203. Id. The plaintiff argued that the requisite amount in controversy could not have been
met since the class only sought injunctive relief and statutory damages for an amount far
below $5,000,000. Id. at 1120, 1123-24.
204. Id. at 1120.
205. Id. at 1121 ("[G]iven the recent enactment of the CAFA, the Court finds no cases,
binding or otherwise, that speak directly to the questions presented.").
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burden on the plaintiff was necessary to fulfill Congress's intent to broaden
federal jurisdiction over class actions under CAFA. 20 6 In reaching this
conclusion, the court relied heavily on the legislative history.20 7 The court
asserted that such a complex statute "cannot address all possible outcomes
and situations," so a "faithful interpretation ... involves more than the text
itself. ' 20 8 Additionally, "disregard[ing]... the explicit and uncontradicted
statements" within the legislative history would stray from the court's
"role ... to faithfully implement the law as intended by the Legislature." 209
The court opined that the failure to include an explicit directive on the
burden of proof in the text of the statute did not demonstrate intent to
maintain the status quo, but more plausibly, "reflect[ed] the Legislature's
expectation that the clear statement in the Senate Report would be sufficient
to shift the burden of proof. '210
Although the court placed the burden on the plaintiff to show that federal
jurisdiction was improper, that determination seems to have had little
impact on its ultimate decision to grant the plaintiffs motion to remand.211
The plaintiff sought only injunctive relief, and the court found that these
"claims [were] so difficult to value that any monetary valuation could only
be wholly speculative." 212  Since the court found no indication that the
injunctive relief would create any considerable monetary value, let alone
$5,000,000, it seems that the court would have reached the same result even
if it had placed the burden on the defendant.
2. District Courts and Legal Commentators Initially Follow Berry
Following the Berry decision in the Central District of California, many
district courts similarly held that, under CAFA, plaintiffs bear the burden of
refuting the district court's removal jurisdiction.213 Each court ruled on
similar grounds, holding that the statements in the Senate Committee
206. Id. at 1122 ("Although the burden of proof is not addressed in either the text of the
original or the text of the new statute, the CAFA was clearly enacted with the purpose of
expanding federal jurisdiction over class actions.").
207. Id. at 1121 (labeling legislative history as an "essential tool" and an "important
resource" when the statute does not squarely address the issue).
208. Id. at 1122.
209. Id.
210. Id. The original diversity statute did not contain a reference to the burden of proof
either. The Berry court claimed that this carried little interpretative value. Id. at 1122-23.
211. Id. at 1123-24.
212. Id. at 1124. The court held that CAFA's amount-in-controversy requirement could
be satisfied by the value of nonmonetary damages to the class members or the cost to the
defendants. Id. at 1123. The court found no indication that the injunctive relief would have
more than a nominal monetary effect on either party. Id. at 1124.
213. See, e.g., Lussier v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. CV 05-768, 2005 WL 2211094 (D.
Or. Sept. 8, 2005); Harvey v. Blockbuster Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 749 (D.N.J. 2005); Natale v.
Pfizer Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D. Mass. 2005); Waitt v. Merck & Co., No. C05-0759L,
2005 WL 1799740 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2005); In re Textainer P'ship Sec. Litig., No. C 05-
0969, 2005 WL 1791559 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2005); Yeroushalmi v. Blockbuster, Inc., No.
CV 05-225, 2005 WL 2083008 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2005).
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Report express a clear intent to place the burden on the party opposing
removal. 214
Most notably, in July 2005, over a month after Berry was decided, Judge
Lasnik of the Western District of Washington ruled on the issue in what he
thought was a matter of first impression.215  Although Judge Lasnik
apparently was unaware of Berry, he used similar reasoning to conclude
that CAFA placed the burden of proof on the plaintiff to disprove removal
jurisdiction. Instead of simply relying on the face of the statute, the court
put heavy emphasis on congressional intent, stating that in cases of
"statutory construction, the Court's task is to 'interpret the words of the
statute in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve.' '216 The court
discussed how Congress had a general intent to "permit federal courts to
hear more interstate class actions and to relax the barriers facing defendants
who seek to remove qualifying class actions to federal court. ' 217 The court,
therefore, found it easy to ignore the absence of language regarding burden
shifting within CAFA, and chose to "divine Congressional intent from
CAFA's legislative history."2 18 Citing the Judiciary Committee's Report,
the court held that the plaintiff should bear the burden of demonstrating that
CAFA's jurisdictional requirements are unfulfilled.219 The court found that
the plaintiff had not met that burden because his brief did not specify the
amount of economic damages incurred by the nationwide class. 220
Therefore, the court denied the plaintiff s motion to remand.221
Additionally, in the fall of 2005, a group of legal commentators weighed
in on the issue, asserting that CAFA had assigned the burden of persuasion
to the party opposing jurisdiction.222 The authors, like the Berry court,
relied heavily on the statements within CAFA's legislative history that
suggest that the burden of proof should be placed on the proponent of
remand. 223 However, unlike Berry and the other district courts that had
214. See, e.g., Harvey, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 752 n.4 ("The Court-in view of the lack of
case law addressing Section 1332(d)-will refer to the underlying Senate Report and
Congressional Record for guidance."); In re Textainer, 2005 WL 1791559, at *3 ("[W]hile
the defendant ordinarily bears the burden of proving that removal was proper, CAFA's
legislative history indicates that the plaintiff has the burden of proving that an action
removed under CAFA should be remanded." (citation omitted)).
215. Waitt, 2005 WL 1799740, at *1 ("Neither the Court nor the parties, as is evident
from their briefing, could find published case law addressing this issue; the matter appears to
be one of first impression in federal jurisprudence.").
216. Id. (quoting Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel.
Co. of Va., 464 U.S. 30, 36 (1983)).
217. Id.
218. Id. at *2.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at *3.
222. H. Hunter Twiford III, Anthony Rollo & John T. Rouse, CAFA's New "Minimal
Diversity" Standard for Interstate Class Actions Creates a Presumption that Jurisdiction
Exists, with the Burden of Proof Assigned to the Party Opposing Jurisdiction, 25 Miss. C. L.
Rev. 7 (2005).
223. See id. at 16-20.
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addressed the issue, the authors also claimed that the portions of CAFA's
legislative history that discuss the burden of proof are "directly connected"
to the "Findings and Purposes" section of the enacted text, and therefore
should be given deference. 224 Moreover, they argued that even absent the
"Findings and Purposes" portion of CAFA, the burden should still be
placed on the proponent of remand because the "Supreme Court's well-
established test to determine which party bears the burden of proof' directs
the district court to consult a statute's legislative history whenever the
statutory text is silent on the issue.225
B. Other Circuit Courts Apply the Traditional Removal Burden to CAFA
Although several district courts agreed with the Central District of
California's opinion in Berry and held that the proponent of remand carries
the burden of proof in a CAFA removal proceeding, support for this
position has dissipated after several circuit courts have held to the contrary.
Part II.B discusses Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Brill v. Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc. ,226 and its influence on other federal courts.
1. Seventh Circuit-Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.
In Brill, the plaintiff filed a class action suit in Cook County, Illinois,
against Countrywide Home Loans alleging violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) as well as other state law violations. 227
The defendant removed the case to federal court, alleging that it fell within
CAFA's new diversity statute, or in the alternative, that the TCPA claim
created federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a).228 The
plaintiff contested removal and the Northern District of Illinois
subsequently granted the plaintiffs motion for remand.229  The district
court held that the TCPA does not confer federal jurisdiction over private
causes of action, and more relevant to this Note, the court found that the
defendant did not meet its burden of establishing CAFA's jurisdictional
requirements. 230 In doing so, the district court apparently ignored the
controversy over which party bears the burden of proving the jurisdictional
224. Id. at 57-60. Specifically, the authors rely on the passage in CAFA's text that states
that one "purpose" of the Act is to "restore the intent of the framers of the United States
Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national
importance under diversity jurisdiction." Id. (quoting Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-2 § 2, 119 Stat. 4, 5 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. 1711)).
225. Id. at 54-55 (citing Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974), and
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991)). For a discussion of Corning Glass Works, see
supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
226. 427 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2005).
227. Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 05-C-2713, 2005 WL 2230193, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2005).
228. Id. at* 1-2.




requirements under CAFA, and simply placed the burden on the defendant,
citing case law in support of the pre-CAFA, common law rule.231
The defendant then took advantage of the new appellate opportunity
created by CAFA and filed an interlocutory appeal to the Seventh Circuit
under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1). 232 Writing for the court, Judge Easterbrook
made a clear statement about CAFA's burden of proof.233  Judge
Easterbrook first noted the practicality of the common law rule. Using the
case at bar as an example, he explained that the plaintiff typically lacks the
pertinent information to calculate the amount in controversy, 234 and
therefore the burden should be placed on the defendant in order to force the
informed party to divulge the necessary information for the court to reach
an accurate decision.235
Judge Easterbrook acknowledged the statement of the Senate Judiciary
Committee236 and decisions of district courts to the contrary, but concluded
that more than "naked legislative history" is needed to alter the long-
standing burden scheme. 237 He reasoned,
When a law sensibly could be read in multiple ways, legislative history
may help a court understand which of these received the political
branches' imprimatur. But when the legislative history stands by itself, as
a naked expression of "intent" unconnected to any enacted text, it has no
more force than an opinion poll of legislators-less, really, as it speaks
for fewer. Thirteen Senators signed this report and five voted not to send
the proposal to the floor. Another 82 Senators did not express themselves
on the question; likewise 435 Members of the House and one President
kept their silence.238
After addressing the burden issue, the court reversed the lower court on the
merits of its decision that diversity jurisdiction pursuant to CAFA was
lacking, finding that the defendant had shown a reasonable probability that
the amount in controversy exceeded $5,000,000.239 The court then held
that the TCPA does not confer exclusive jurisdiction upon state courts, and
therefore did not preclude the defendant from removing the case pursuant to
231. Id. at *2 (citing King v. Wal-Mart Stores, 940 F. Supp. 213, 216 (S.D. Ind. 1996), to
show that "the party seeking the federal forum has the burden of coming forward with
competent proof to establish at least a reasonable probability that the amount in controversy
requirement is satisfied.").
232. Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 447 (7th Cir. 2005); see supra
notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
233. Id. at 447-48.
234. Id. at 447 (noting that the plaintiff is in no position to show how many unsolicited
faxes were sent without extensive discovery).
235. Id. at 447-48.
236. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
237. Brill, 427 F.3d at 448.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 449.
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CAFA or section 1441(a).240 Therefore, the court found removal proper
and remanded the case to the district court to be decided on the merits.241
2. The Seventh Circuit Decision Influences Subsequent Courts
The Seventh Circuit opinion in Brill has been highly influential precedent
on this issue in other federal courts. Following similar logic, the majority
of district courts that have addressed the issue after Brill have held that
CAFA did not alter the traditional rule that the party that invokes federal
jurisdiction and opposes remand bears the burden of proving that
jurisdiction exists.242 Although the position of the Berry court initially
gained support, 24 3 after Judge Easterbook's decision in Brill, it appears that,
as of the time of this writing, only one court has found that the named
plaintiff should bear the burden of showing that diversity jurisdiction is
lacking. In Dinkel v. General Motors Corp., the District Court for the
District of Maine denied the plaintiff's motion to remand after rejecting the
plaintiff's argument that the action commenced prior to CAFA's enactment,
and therefore should be governed by the pre-CAFA diversity
requirements. 244 In dicta, citing Berry, the court stated that, according to
the Senate Judiciary Committee Report, plaintiff "should bear the burden of
240. Id. at 450-51.
241. Id. at 452.
242. Moniz v. Bayer, 447 F. Supp. 2d 31, 34 (D. Mass. 2006) ("[T]he clear majority of
courts that have addressed the issue have held that, even where CAFA applies, the burden of
proof on a motion to remand remains with the removing party because the text of the statute
says nothing about changing that long-standing rule."); see, e.g., Prime Care of N.E. Kan.,
LLC v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kan., No. 05-2227, 2006 WL 2734469 (D. Kan. Sept.
25, 2006); Morgan v. Gay, No. 06-1371, 2006 WL 2265302 (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2006); Tiffany
v. Hometown Buffet, Inc., No. C 06-2524, 2006 WL 1749557 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2006);
Eufaula Drugs, Inc. v. TDI Managed Care Servs., Inc., No. 2:05-CV-293, 2006 WL 986976
(M.D. Ala. Apr. 14, 2006); Adams v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 426 F. Supp. 2d 356 (S.D. W. Va.
2006); Werner v. KPMG LLP, 415 F. Supp. 2d 688 (S.D. Tex. 2006); Rodgers v. Cent.
Locating Serv., Ltd., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (W.D. Wash 2006); Ongstad v. Piper Jaffray &
Co., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (D.N.D. 2006).
243. See supra Part II.A.2.
244. Dinkel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 400 F. Supp. 2d 289 (D. Me. 2005). The plaintiff filed
his class action complaint in Kansas state court on February 17, 2005, one day before the
enactment of CAFA. Id. at 291. He subsequently served the complaint in a timely manner
on most defendants in April 2005, but did not serve others until June 2005. Id. The new
diversity jurisdiction under CAFA does not apply if the action commences prior to its
enactment on February 18, 2005. However, under Kansas law, an action officially
commences on the filing date only if process is served on all defendants within ninety days.
Id. at 292. The defendants who were served more than ninety days after the complaint was
filed removed the case to federal court, claiming that diversity jurisdiction existed under
CAFA. Id. at 291. The plaintiff then voluntarily dismissed these defendants without
prejudice in an apparent attempt to avoid federal jurisdiction. Id. The Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation transferred the case to the District of Maine, where the court
eventually denied the plaintiff's motion to remand because when a removing defendant no
longer needs consent of the other parties to remove, "the entire lawsuit.., is removed, not
merely the claims against that defendant." Id. at 292, 294. The plaintiff "cannot now 'unring
the bell' by dismissing the Removal Defendants." Id. at 294.
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demonstrating that the removal was improvident. '245 The District of Maine
decided Dinkel only about three weeks after the Seventh Circuit decided
Brill, and did not mention Judge Easterbrook's opinion as contrary
authority.
Besides this brief piece of dicta from the Dinkel court, the Seventh
Circuit's opinion in Brill seems to have ended the developing split of
authority in the federal courts. The Second, Third, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits have all since joined the Seventh Circuit in holding that CAFA did
not alter the common law rule of burden of proof on the proponent of
federal jurisdiction.246 In fact, the Ninth Circuit's treatment of the issue
effectively overruled Berry, and indeed, the Central District of California
complied by placing the burden of proof on the proponent of removal in a
subsequent case.247
Each circuit relied on reasoning largely similar to that of Judge
Easterbrook to conclude that the burden of proving CAFA's diversity
requirements should remain on the removing party.248 Therefore, rather
than examining each opinion, the remaining portion of Part II discusses just
the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit opinions. Both courts thoroughly expand
upon Judge Easterbrook's arguments and apply the burden under slightly
different circumstances. Part II.B.2.a discusses Abrego Abrego v. Dow
Chemical Co., in which the Ninth Circuit places the burden on the
removing party to prove the existence of CAFA's "mass action"
jurisdictional requirements. Part II.B.2.b examines Evans v. Walter
Industries Inc. and Miedema v. Maytag Corp., which, read together, place
the initial burden of proof on the moving party, but place a secondary
burden on the nonmoving party to establish a statutory exception to subject
matter jurisdiction.
a. Ninth Circuit Applies the Traditional Burden in a "Mass Action "-
Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chemical Co.
In April 2005, over one thousand Panamanian banana plantation workers
filed suit in state court against multiple defendants, alleging injuries
245. Id. at 295.
246. See Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469 (3d Cir. 2006); DiTolla v. Doral Dental IPA of
N.Y., LLC, 469 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 2006); Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322 (11th
Cir. 2006); Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 678 (9th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam).
247. See Lao v. Wickes Furniture Co., 455 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1049 (C.D. Cal. 2006)
("Insofar as the amount in controversy requirement contained in CAFA is concerned, the
Ninth Circuit has already held that it is the removing party, that is, defendants, who bear the
burden of proof." (citing Abrego Abrego, 443 F.3d at 685)).
248. See, e.g., Blockbuster Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Brill and
concluding that "[i]n the absence of a clear textual directive to alter such a long established
principle of federal jurisdiction, [the court should] decline to do so"); Morgan, 471 F.3d at
473 (citing Judge Frank Easterbrook for the proposition that a "problem with relying solely
on CAFA's legislative history is that the portion that supports burden-shifting does not
concern any text in the bill that eventually became law" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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resulting from continued exposure to a chemical pesticide known as
DBCP. 249 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, including Dow
Chemical, used DBCP on plantations even after the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency restricted the use of DBCP in the United States in
1979.250 The case was not filed as a state class action, but was to be tried
jointly on the ground that each plaintiffs claims involved common
questions of law or fact.251 Dow Chemical then filed a notice of removal in
the Central District of California attempting to invoke CAFA's "mass
action"252 provision.253 After the district court concluded that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the case because Dow Chemical had failed
to meet its burden of proving the requisite "mass action" provisions, Dow
Chemical appealed to the Ninth Circuit arguing, inter alia, that plaintiffs
bear the burden of refuting removal jurisdiction under CAFA.254
The Ninth Circuit took an objective approach on the burden issue similar
to that of the Seventh Circuit. The court cited Brill, noting that its sister
court had rejected the same argument because there is no language in
CAFA to support it.255 The court acknowledged that consulting legislative
history is a valuable tool of statutory interpretation, but only when the plain
language of the statute is ambiguous. 256 As to CAFA's burden issue, and
other instances of statutory silence, the court "presume[s] that Congress is
aware of the legal context in which it is legislating." 257
The Ninth Circuit found that the ordinary presumption of congressional
awareness was strengthened because the rule that the removing defendant
bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction was so long-standing that it is
"near-canonical. '258  In addition, the court pointed out that CAFA
contained many significant modifications of federal precedent, both
statutory and judge-made; the decision explicitly to reverse certain
established principles of federal subject matter jurisdiction, and not others,
shows Congress's detailed understanding of the existing law and
strengthens the presumption that Congress was fully aware of the pertinent
law in the area in which it was legislating.259  Therefore, the court
concluded that the common law rule should be enforced because Congress,
by not explicitly addressing the burden issue within the text of the statute,
249. See Abrego Abrego, 443 F.3d at 678.
250. Id.
251. See id.; Mullenix, supra note 131, at 12.
252. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
253. Abrego Abrego, 443 F.3d at 678.
254. Id. at 678-79.
255. Id. at 683.
256. Id.





could expect that CAFA would be applied in conjunction with the existing
rule to place the burden on the moving party.260
The court acknowledged that CAFA's provisions broadened federal
jurisdiction over certain types of class actions. However, the court was not
convinced that a general legislative intent to broaden the federal judiciary's
ability to adjudicate class actions overrules every common law principle
that previously impeded removal. Instead, the court "conclude[d] that...
Congress carefully inserted into the legislation the changes it intended and
did not mean otherwise to alter the jurisdictional terrain." 261
b. Eleventh Circuit Refines the Standard for CAFA's Statutory
Exceptions-Evans v. Walter Industries, Inc. and Miedema v. Maytag Corp.
The Eleventh Circuit first addressed the issue of which party should bear
the burden of proving CAFA's jurisdictional requirements in a remand
action in Evans v. Walter Industries, Inc.262 In Evans, the plaintiffs filed a
class action complaint in the Circuit Court of Calhoun County, Alabama,
alleging property damage arising from the defendants' release of waste over
a period of eighty-five years. 263 Four defendants removed the case to
federal court, and the plaintiffs promptly moved to remand, arguing that the
case fell within CAFA's local controversy exception.264 The district court
held that the case did fall within the local controversy exception, and
therefore remanded the case to the state court; the defendants appealed. 265
The court's discussion of the issue was limited. Citing Brill, the court
simply stated, without any further analysis, that "CAFA does not change the
traditional rule that the party seeking to remove the case to federal court
bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction."266 However, the court
still faced the dispute over which party should bear the burden of
establishing the local controversy exception after CAFA's basic
requirements for removal to federal court already had been fulfilled.
Neither Brill nor Abrego Abrego involved a removing defendant that
fulfilled its burden of proving CAFA's preliminary jurisdictional
requirements, so the Evans court faced a question of first impression.267
260. See id. ("[lit is not only appropriate but also realistic to presume that Congress was
thoroughly familiar with these unusually important precedents from this and other federal
courts and that it expected its enactment to be interpreted in conformity with them." (citing
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 696-99 (1979))).
261. Id. at 684-85.
262. 449 F.3d 1159 (1 1th Cir. 2006).
263. Id. at 1161.
264. Id.; see supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
265. Evans, 449 F.3d at 1161.
266. Id. at 1164.
267. See id. at 1165 ("No other Circuit appears to have addressed the specific question of
which party should bear the burden of proof on CAFA's local controversy exception....
Thus, we address as a question of first impression the issue of who bears the burden of
proving the local controversy exception, once the removing defendants have proved the
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The court followed the pre-CAFA, common law rule that "when a party
seeks to avail itself of an express statutory exception to federal
jurisdiction.., the party seeking remand bears the burden of proof with
regard to that exception." 268 Therefore, the court held that "plaintiffs bear
the burden of proving the local controversy exception to the jurisdiction
otherwise established. '269 Subsequently, the court found that the plaintiffs
had not fulfilled the burden of proving that their case should be heard in
state court under the local controversy exception and therefore reversed the
decision of the district court.2 70
In Miedema v. Maytag Corp.,271 the Eleventh Circuit expanded on Evans
and held that CAFA did not alter the traditional rule that the moving party
bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction. In October 2005,
plaintiff filed a class action complaint in a Florida state court, alleging
defects in various appliances manufactured by the defendant. 272 The
defendant quickly removed the case to the Southern District of Florida,
under CAFA, claiming that the parties were diverse and the case involved
over 100 plaintiffs for an aggregate amount in controversy over
$5,000,000.273 The District Court for the Southern District of Florida
granted the plaintiffs subsequent motion to remand, finding that in the face
of uncertainty over the true amount in controversy, it must resolve all doubt
in favor of remand. 274 The defendant appealed to the Eleventh Circuit,
arguing, inter alia, that CAFA's "legislative history expresses a clear intent
to require that an objecting plaintiff demonstrate removal was improvident,
i.e., that all applicable jurisdictional requirements were not met. ''275
The court quickly rejected this argument. First, the court cited Brill,
Abrego Abrego, and its own jurisprudence in Evans, to support this
stance.276 The court then explained that the plaintiff's argument was flawed
because (as similarly stated by the Supreme Court in Allapattah277)
legislative history can be used only to interpret ambiguous statutory
language. 278 Hence, the court claimed "no authority" to adopt plaintiffs
amount in controversy and the minimal diversity requirement, and thus have established
federal court jurisdiction under § 1332(d)(2).").
268. Id. at 1164 (quoting Breuer v. Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691, 697-98
(2003)); see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
269. Evans, 449 F.3d at 1165.
270. Seeid. at 1166-68.
271. 450 F.3d 1322 (1 1th Cir. 2006).
272. Id. at 1324.
273. Id. at 1325.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1327.
276. Id. at 1328.
277. See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
278. See id. ("[T]his Circuit previously explained that [w]hile a committee report may
ordinarily be used to interpret unclear language contained in a statute, a committee report
cannot serve as an independent statutory source having the force of law." (internal quotation
marks and emphasis omitted)).
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position and thereby "enforce principles gleaned solely from legislative
history that has no statutory reference point."'279
The court acknowledged that Congress clearly intended to expand federal
jurisdiction, but refused to accept that a general intent to facilitate removal
of class actions to federal courts effectively overruled every common-law
principle that favors the plaintiff on a motion to remand. The court
reasoned that since CAFA overruled particular aspects of established
common law and kept others intact, clearly Congress knew of the existing
law, and if it wished to change the burden of proof, it would have stated so
within the text of CAFA.280 The court also cast doubt on the efficiency of
the plaintiff s proposed standard, writing in a footnote,
Notably, the standards urged by Maytag would leave courts with lingering
doubts about the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. The mere fact
that a plaintiff failed to prove that subject matter jurisdiction did not exist,
for example, would not necessarily mean that subject matter jurisdiction
did exist. As a result, class actions could conceivably proceed through
removal, an initial 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) appeal, discovery, and perhaps
even summary judgment or trial before it became apparent that subject
matter jurisdiction was in fact lacking. Such a result is difficult to
reconcile with CAFA's apparent concern for the swift resolution of
disputes over federal jurisdiction, as evidenced by the 7-day and 60-day
deadlines imposed by § 1453(c). 281
After concluding that the burden was correctly placed on Maytag by the
district court, the Miedema court found that there was still "great
uncertainty" over the amount in controversy. 282  The court therefore
affirmed the trial court's decision to remand the case to state court.283
III. CAFA DID NOT SHIFT THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON A MOTION TO
REMAND TO THE PLAINTIFFS
Part III.A of this Note argues that, under Supreme Court precedent, the
statements from CAFA's legislative history that direct federal judges to
place the burden on the plaintiff during a motion to remand do not carry the
force of law. Part III.B posits that providing authority to legislative history
with no statutory reference point would create a means for interested parties
to undermine the lawmaking process. Part III.C argues that the burden of
279. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In a similar vein, the court rejected
defendant's argument that any doubts over the amount in controversy should be resolved in
favor of finding jurisdiction. Id. at 1328-29. The court found the statements in CAFA's
legislative history insufficient, standing alone, to justify departure from the well-established
rule of construing the removal statutes strictly and erring on the side of remand. Id.
280. See id. at 1329 ("While the text of CAFA plainly expands federal jurisdiction over
class actions and facilitates their removal, we presume that Congress legislates against the
backdrop of established principles of state and federal common law, and that when it wishes
to deviate from deeply rooted principles, it will say so." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
281. Id. at 1330 n.8.
282. Id. at 1332.
283. Id.
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proving CAFA's diversity requirements should remain on the proponent of
federal jurisdiction to constrain properly the limited power given to federal
courts and promote judicial efficiency. For these reasons, federal courts
should follow the U.S. Courts of Appeals and place the burden of proving
CAFA's diversity requirements on the proponent of federal jurisdiction.
A. 'Naked' Legislative History Is Not Enough to Switch the Burden of
Proof
It is a "near-canonical" rule that the proponent of federal jurisdiction
bears the burden of proving the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, 284
and CAFA does not address the burden issue within its statutory text.285
However, the almost identical statements within the Senate Judiciary
Committee Report and the House Sponsor's Statement clearly suggest that,
under CAFA, the burden should be placed on the proponent of remand to
demonstrate that removal was improper. 286 Several district courts have
accorded too much authority to these congressional statements and placed
the burden of proving CAFA's diversity requirements after removal on the
plaintiff.287 However, since Judge Easterbrook's decision in Brill, the vast
majority of courts have held that CAFA did not affect the long-standing
rule that the proponent of federal jurisdiction bears the burden of
establishing the diversity requirements. 288
Considering its recent decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court would most
likely agree with the U.S. Courts of Appeals that have ruled on the issue.
Despite its frequent practice of consulting legislative history, the Supreme
Court has recently used a more objective approach to statutory
interpretation, requiring ambiguity within the statutory text before the
legislative history can be consulted. 289 Some intentionalists have argued
that if a statute's legislative history addresses an issue that has no textual
reference point, then the statute is ambiguous, and the court should consult
the legislative history to glean congressional intent.290 In fact, a group of
commentators have interpreted Corning Glass Works v. Brennan to allow
the district court to consult the legislative history to discern a statute's
burden of proof when the enacted text is silent on the issue.291 Their
analysis is misguided. The Court in Brennan never established a clear
standard-it never explained the reasoning behind its method of statutory
interpretation and also relied in part on the burden allocation of similar
statutes.292 On the other hand, in Shannon v. United States, the court
284. See supra notes 30-35, 258 and accompanying text.
285. See supra Part I.B.2.d.
286. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
287. See supra Part II.A.
288. See supra Part II.B.2.
289. See supra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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unambiguously stated that legislative history should not be accorded any
authority when it is unconnected to enacted text.293 The Court refused to
impose certain principles from the IDRA's legislative history, stating that
"courts have no authority to enforce a principle gleaned solely from
legislative history that has no statutory reference point. '294 The Court
acknowledged the ongoing debate between jurists regarding the proper use
of legislative history in statutory interpretation, but opined that neither
group could reasonably accord authority to the legislative history in this
type of situation because it would eliminate the importance of the enacted
statutory text "as a guide in the interpretative process. '295  Since the
circumstances in Shannon were nearly identical to CAFA's burden issue,
there is no reason to believe that the Court would depart from this reasoning
and defer to the statements within CAFA's legislative history.
With CAFA, Congress clearly intended to eliminate many of the
impediments that allowed plaintiffs' attorneys to keep large class actions in
the more favorable state courts.296 It expanded diversity jurisdiction over
class actions and did away with many of the restrictions on removal. 297
Placing the burden of proving CAFA's diversity requirements on the
plaintiff during a motion to remand would also broaden federal jurisdiction,
although minimally. When the class size or amount in controversy is
ambiguous, a class action would remain in federal court until plaintiffs
could make an affirmative showing that removal was improvident.
However, it is assumed that Congress is aware of the pertinent law in the
area that it is legislating.298 It can choose to overrule some principles and
leave others untouched to reach a desired end. Likewise, CAFA's general
intent to facilitate removal should not effectively overrule every common
law principle (e.g., the burden of proving diversity jurisdiction) that favors
a defendant on a motion to remand. Considering CAFA's broad expansion
of class action diversity jurisdiction and relaxation of the removal
requirements, it is unnecessary to switch the burden to the proponent of
remand in order to accomplish CAFA's "purpose" of eliminating abuses
through the federalization of interstate class actions. In fact, commentators
have noticed that the changes made to federal procedure by CAFA's
statutory text were adequate to accomplish the goal of broadening federal
jurisdiction over class actions.2 99 Such thorough reformation of class action
293. See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
294. Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 584 (1994); see supra note 198 and
accompanying text.
295. Shannon, 515 U.S. at 583; see supra note 197 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 69-74, 101-33 and accompanying text.
297. See supra Part I.B.2.a-b.
298. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
299. See Peter Geier, CAFA a Year Later? Not So Bad: Plaintiffs' Fears of Tort Reform
Fading, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 6, 2006, at 1 (finding that CAFA has been relatively successful at
bringing more class actions into federal court and shutting down "magnet courts").
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procedure evidences that Congress thoughtfully put to text the changes that
it intended to make and intentionally omitted mention of all other issues.
B. Providing Authority to Statements Within a Statute's Legislative History
with No Textual Reference Point Would Undermine Congress's Lawmaking
Function
Typically, committee reports and sponsors' statements have been treated
as the most reliable indicia of congressional intent.300 With nearly identical
statements within the Senate Judiciary Committee Report and the House
Sponsors' Statements, many intentionalists would surely conclude that at
least some members of Congress intended to place the burden of proving
CAFA's diversity requirements on the plaintiff during a motion to
remand.30 1 However, Justice Scalia has frequently argued that legislative
history is wholly unreliable because statements often are inserted at the
request of lobbyists or other interested parties to manipulate judicial
construction.30 2 This argument does not seem very compelling when a
judge chooses to consult legislative history to glean the meaning of an
ambiguous portion of the statutory text. It seems unlikely that an interested
party would seek to insert biased statements into the legislative history to
affect the judicial interpretation of a portion of the statutory text that has yet
to be deemed ambiguous by the judiciary. Such efforts would be highly
speculative and limited to manipulating the reading of the already enacted
statutory language. It could not introduce new elements that are not
addressed in the enacted text, e.g., the burden of proving CAFA's diversity
requirements.
On the other hand, Scalia's argument seems particularly relevant if
judges were to provide authority to statements within the legislative history
as if they had the force of law. If a legislator cannot find support on a
particular issue related to the legislation at hand, he could attempt to insert
statements into a committee report that purport to reflect congressional
intent, but actually promote his failed legislation. Indeed, Justice Scalia has
noted that committee reports are not always drafted carefully to reflect true
congressional intent, but statements are often inserted "at best by a
committee staff member on his or her own initiative, and at worst by a
committee staff member at the suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist. '30 3
Therefore, it is worth noting that many have perceived the push for class
action reform, including CAFA, as a political maneuver designed to reduce
the legal liability of large corporations. 304 Obviously, business lobbyists
had incentive to encourage legislators to broaden federal jurisdiction over
class actions as widely as possible. Congress suggested that federal courts
300. See supra notes 152-65 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
303. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
304. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
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are less likely to certify classes, which limits potential liability.30 5 There is
no evidence that a Congressman disingenuously inserted the statements
regarding CAFA's burden of proof at the request of political forces, but a
situation in which the statement is unconnected to any statutory text
presents the greatest risk of abuse. When legislative history is unconnected
to the statutory text, however, it is likely impossible to determine if
statements were inserted for a proper purpose. Hypothetically, even if the
pertinent portions of CAFA's legislative history were written in good faith
and the drafters did intend to place the burden of proof on the class
plaintiffs, gleaning law solely from the legislative history would set
meaningful precedent and therefore create an incentive for dishonest
politicians to hide statements within a bill's legislative history in the future.
This would create an unreliable standard in which legislative history holds
as much authority as the enacted statutory text. It would undermine the
constitutionally mandated lawmaking process and provide private interests
a viable method to manipulate the law.
C. Placing the Burden of Proof on the Nonmoving Party Would Not
Promote Judicial Efficiency
Unlike state courts, federal courts have limited power to adjudicate
disputes. 30 6 Since federal courts may hear only the types of cases spelled
out in Article III and further authorized by a statutory grant of Congress,
federal courts have taken caution not to hear cases outside of these limits
and infringe upon the power left to the states. 307 Federal courts have used
burden allocation accordingly. Whether the case is originally filed in
federal court or removed from the state system, placing the initial burden of
proving subject matter jurisdiction on the proponent of the federal forum
forces an affirmative showing of jurisdiction in order to proceed. 30 8
Congress can prioritize judicial resources to fit current needs and amend
the limits of federal subject matter jurisdiction as necessary. 30 9 This can
been seen in the transformation of diversity jurisdiction over the years. It
originally carried a $500 amount-in-controversy requirement, but Congress
has periodically increased the requirement (currently at $75,000) when
monetary inflation imposed a need to limit federal jurisdiction further.310
CAFA was enacted along the same lines. Finding class action abuses in the
state system, Congress broadened federal jurisdiction over large class
actions to help alleviate the problem.311 However, when Congress decides
to broaden or narrow federal jurisdiction, it changes only the range of
305. See supra notes 52-53, 87 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
307. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 15, 17, 19 and accompanying text.
311. See supra Part I.B. 1, 2.b.
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disputes that the federal system can properly adjudicate. It does not alter
the fundamental tenet that federal courts are limited, and hearing a case
outside of those imposed limits still amounts to an unconstitutional
violation of the states' right to settle disputes.
Moreover, it would be a waste of judicial resources if Congress were to
amend CAFA to include a statutory provision that directs a court deciding a
motion to remand to place the burden on the plaintiff to show that
jurisdiction is absent. It would certainly not affect all cases.312 However,
the burden allocation would have a substantial effect on cases where the
class size or amount in controversy is very close to CAFA's thresholds for
diversity jurisdiction. If the burden were on the nonmoving party, a
situation in which a party fails to prove that subject matter jurisdiction does
not exist would not necessarily indicate that subject matter jurisdiction does
exist. Therefore, complicated class action suits in which the potential class
size or the amount in controversy is not immediately apparent may be swept
into federal court only to discover later in the process (possibly during trial)
that subject matter jurisdiction may be lacking. This leads to a clear waste
of judicial resources; the court would be forced to rehash the same
jurisdictional issue to ensure that it is not hearing a case outside of its
jurisdictional bounds. This system would also impose unnecessary delay on
these cases, which does not coincide with CAFA's stated purpose of
ensuring the "fair and prompt" resolution of class actions. 313 Overall, the
process would be more efficient if the court continued to place the initial
burden on the proponent of the federal forum to make an affirmative
showing of diversity jurisdiction in order to proceed.
CONCLUSION
District courts should follow the opinions of the Second, Third, Seventh,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits and continue to place the initial burden of
proving CAFA's diversity requirements on the proponent of the federal
forum. CAFA was enacted with a clear intent to broaden the federal
judiciary's ability to adjudicate large class actions. However, a general
intent to facilitate removal coupled with "naked" legislative history is not
enough to overturn the "near-canonical" rule that the proponent of federal
jurisdiction bears the burden of proving the existence of subject matter
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has clearly stated that principles taken
from the legislative history without any link to the statutory text are to be
given no authority. If courts hold otherwise, they will be wasting judicial
312. For example, in Berry v. American Express Publishing Corp., the court chose to
place the burden of proof on the plaintiff, but that determination did not affect the ultimate
decision on the motion to remand since the court concluded that the potential monetary value
of the requested injunctive relief was completely speculative. See supra notes 206, 212 and
accompanying text.
313. See supra note 47.
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resources and enabling interested parties to undermine the constitutionally
mandated lawmaking process.
